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Health care spending is a major concern in the United States. State and federal 
governments have been engaged in a number of health care system reform initiatives 
designed to contain costs by regulating both price and quantity. Comprehensive 
evaluations of these initiatives are crucial for policymakers reshaping and expanding 
reforms.  
This dissertation evaluates the impact of Maryland's Global Budget Revenue 
(GBR) program, one of the most innovative statewide hospital payment reforms, on 
birth-related hospital utilization. The GBR program was designed to provide 
incentives for hospitals to reduce high-cost services and substitute them for lower-
cost population health investments. This is largely accomplished by capitating annual 
budgets. This dissertation evaluated the effects of GBR on high-cost neonatal services, 
  
especially the neonatal intensive care unit (NICU). I examine heterogeneous 
treatment effects with respect to observable clinical needs and financial incentives.  
In Chapter One, I provide an overview of Maryland’s GBR program and 
introduce the conceptual framework. In Chapter Two, I examine the impact of GBR 
on NICU admissions and infant mortality. I explore the heterogeneity of treatment 
effects by infant health risk. Chapter Three expands the analysis to broader birth-
related hospital services by investigating the impact of GBR on length of stay (LOS), 
the total cost of care, and utilization of specific high-cost services. Chapter Four 
departs from GBR and examines NICU utilization related to another critical source of 
financial incentive – health insurance type. Chapter Five concludes the dissertation. 
I find that Maryland's GBR program led to a substantial decline in NICU 
admissions, which was mainly driven by the decrease in admissions of relatively 
healthy infants, and there are no changes in the infant or neonatal mortality rate. The 
GBR program is also associated with declines in LOS and high-cost services used for 
infants. Finally, I observe that infant, maternal, and state characteristics explain the 
variations in NICU care across insurance type for high-risk infants but not for 
relatively low-risk infants. My findings provide positive evidence on implementing 
global hospital budget programs and shed light on the economic incentives affecting 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
Rising health care spending is a major concern facing the United States. In 2016, 
health care spending accounted for 17.8% of GDP, far outpacing spending in other 
developed countries (Papanicolas, Woskie, and Jha 2018). This spending is driven by 
high prices that result from new medical technologies, non-competitive market structures, 
and the excess utilization of services resulting from fee-for-service payment systems 
(Dieleman et al. 2017; Schroeder and Frist 2013; Cutler and McClellan 2001). State and 
federal governments have been engaging in a number of health care system reform 
initiatives that could help contain costs by regulating both price and quantity (Center for 
Medicare & Medicaid Innovation 2018). Comprehensive evaluations of these initiatives 
are crucial for policymakers reshaping future large-scale payment reforms.  
This dissertation evaluates the impact of Maryland's Global Budget Revenue 
(GBR) program, one of the most innovative statewide hospital payment reforms since 
2014, focusing on birth-related hospital utilization that accounts for approximately 10% 
of overall U.S. inpatient admissions each year. The GBR program was designed to 
provide incentives for hospitals to reduce high-cost services and substitute them for 
lower-cost population health investments. This dissertation focuses on high-cost neonatal 
services and examines heterogeneous effects with respect to observable clinical needs 
and financial incentives.  
In this introductory chapter, I provide background information on Maryland’s 




current findings on evaluating GBR. Next, I introduce the conceptual frameworks. I 
conclude this chapter with a brief preview of Chapters Two, Three, and Four. 
1.1 Background 
1.1.1 Maryland’s All-Payer Rate-setting System  
Maryland has operated a nationally unique “All-payer” hospital rate-setting 
system since 1977. The system was running under a Medicare Waiver (codified in 
Section 1814(b) of the Social Security Act), which allows Maryland to rate Medicare 
services separately from the Inpatient Prospective Payment System (IPPS) and Outpatient 
Prospective Payment System (OPPS) (Cohen 2005). The system allowed Maryland to 
pay higher Medicare fees, and then it set all payers to the same unit price (fees). Under 
this waiver, the price of a given service was equated across all payers, but not necessarily 
across all hospitals. Hospital rates were based on hospitals’ historical costs and set to 
equal among payers (Giuriceo et al. 2016). This rate-setting process was regulated by an 
independent agency: the Health Services Cost Review Commission (HSCRC).  
The all-payer rate-setting system was expected to constrain hospital costs, 
guarantee access, improve equity and fairness of hospital financing, and keep the system 
accountable to the public (Kastor and Adashi 2011). As a result, the system led to lower 
hospital prices in Maryland compared with other states. From 1977 to 2009, Maryland 
hospital’s cost per admission changed from 26 percent above the national average to 2.5 
percent below the national average (Kastor and Adashi 2011). However, the all-payer rate 
setting system was blamed for giving hospitals an incentive to increase the volume of 




the national average (Pope 2019) and per capita Medicare total spending ranked among 
the highest in the US heading into 2010 (KFF 2014). Maryland hospital discharges per 
1,000 Medicare enrollees were also higher than the national average (Dartmouth Atlas 
Project 2019). Based on this evidence, it appears that hospitals did compensate for lower 
average unit prices by increasing volumes.  
1.1.2 Settings of Maryland’s Global Budget Revenue Program 
To restraint total spending (rather than per capita cost only) and to further 
improve quality, Maryland initiated a new payment model in 2014 known as the "Global 
Budget Revenue (GBR) program" or “All-payer Model”, which capped the annual 
growth of the total hospital spending to 3.58%, the state's 10-year compound historic 
economic growth rate (CMS 2018). This was a bold step aiming at solving current 
problems while retaining its unique rate-setting system. 
A pilot model was first tested by CMS in partnership with the State of Maryland 
before the formal implementation. This pilot model was known as the “Total Patient 
Revenue (TPR) system” and was implemented in 8 rural acute-care hospitals in Maryland 
from July 1, 2010 to June 30, 2013. 
Full GBR implementation took effect on January 1, 2014 that expanded to all 46 
Maryland acute-care hospitals. By July 2014, all of the hospitals in the state successfully 
transited to operate under this global budget system. The “Model Agreement” requires 
that key requirements must be met, as shown in Table 1.1 (HSCRC 2018b). The 





Table 1.1: Model Agreement 
General Requirement Medicare Requirements 
All-payer per capita total hospital revenue 
growth must be limited to 3.58 percent per 
year 
Five-year Medicare per beneficiary total 
hospital cost savings must equal or exceed 
$330 million 
The rate of hospital-acquired conditions 
(HACs) must be reduced by 30 percent 
The aggregate Medicare 30-day all-cause 
readmission rate must be reduced to at or 
below the national average 
Hospital payment must transition away 
from volume-based payments 
Total Medicare spending per beneficiary 
growth must fall below certain national 
growth rates 
Maryland must submit a plan at the end of 
2016 to move beyond hospitals and limit 
the growth in total hospital and non-
hospital Medicare spending 
 
The program sets a fixed budget for each hospital on inpatient, outpatient, and 
emergency department services based on its historical volume and limits all-payer per 
capita total hospital revenue growth rate to be within 3.58 percent each year over a 5-year 
period. The budget was also based on patient mix and services and adjusted annually to 
take into account other uncertainties such as inflation, changes in the community, service 
levels, or shifting of services to other settings. Each hospital knows its total revenue of 
that year in advance.  
The key feature of GBR is that hospital revenues are expected to conform closely 
to the global budgets. Penalties are applied if revenues vary from the allowed global 
budget beyond a narrow 0.5 percent corridor. Hospitals get penalties for the portion of 
over or under 0.5 percent of the budget. The charges that are under the budget within 0.5% 
will be credited into the following year’s budget, and overage amounts will be debited 
from the following year’s budget. Hospitals can also obtain additional payments by 




patient experience measures, and mortality. Considering that the actual utilization is 
unlikely to perfectly match the projected utilization on which the global budget is based, 
to compensate for some deviation, the program also gives some freedom for hospitals to 
adjust their prices within ±5% (price adjustments larger than (±5%) were subject to the 
review and approval of the HSCRC).  
Given these features, GBR changed the incentive of hospitals to generate earnings 
created from the fee-for-service system. It moved hospital financing from fee-for-service, 
where hospitals get paid for more “heads in beds” and keeping them for a long time, to 
paying for value and outcomes while not bringing patients in unnecessarily. Before GBR, 
hospitals increased the volume of patients to earn more revenue since the prices were 
regulated. Under GBR, the expected revenue is stabilized. In order to maximize the 
revenue, hospitals need to keep their expenditure aligned with the budget by limiting 
volumes and managing high-cost services. The features also give hospitals a strong 
incentive to adjust their prices to reach their global budgets when they have lower-than-
expected volumes, which may also increase operating margins per volume (Giuriceo et al. 
2016, 2018).  
In addition, Maryland’s all-payer system created incentives that were different 
from the IPPS. Specifically, Maryland’s system before GBR, which paid for each unit of 
service provided, incentivized hospitals to increase not only overall volume (admissions 
and readmissions, i.e., extensive margins) but also the number of services for each 
admission/readmission (i.e., intensive margins). Unlike Maryland’s system, other 
hospitals under the IPPS had incentives to increase overall volume (outside of 




intensive margins) such as testing, procedures, LOS, and units of services. Although 
hospitals were paid under GBR by using previous rates from a universe of 51 revenue 
centers and the units of service provided (Giuriceo et al. 2016), by fixing the hospitals’ 
total revenue, GBR created new incentives for hospitals to reduce both overall volume 
(which is not provided by the IPPS), i.e., admissions/readmission, and the number of 
services for each admission/readmission (similar to the IPPS), to fully receive the 
expected revenue and increase profit. 
The global budget rate-setting applies to all the Maryland residents and most out-
of-state residents who received services in Maryland hospitals, with an exception (before 
2017) for out-of-state residents visiting Johns Hopkins Hospital and its affiliates in 
Maryland. Medicare beneficiaries who received out-of-state hospital care are also part of 
the hospitals’ global budgets (Berenson 2015). More details on the GBR program can be 
found in RTI’s annual reports (Giuriceo et al. 2016).   
1.1.3 Previous Findings on the Effects of Maryland’s Global Budget Revenue 
Program on Hospital Utilization 
By July 2014, all 36 general acute-care urban hospitals shifted 95% (the 
remaining 5% excluded from the global budget was the revenue for out-of-state patients) 
of their revenue into global budgets (with the exception of Holy Cross Germantown in 
October 2014)  (Giuriceo et al. 2016). Evaluations for the GBR program, including all 
Maryland hospitals, were reported annually by RTI International starting in 2015 
(Giuriceo et al. 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019). These annual reports cover a wide range of 
content, including hospital service utilization, hospital service mix, market dynamics, 




whether service provided in hospital outpatient settings shifted to nonregulated settings). 
The first annual report was only conducted on Medicare beneficiaries, and later reports 
expanded to commercial plan members and Medicaid beneficiaries. Aside from the RTI’s 
reports, there were a few pieces of literature evaluating the GBR for both pilot and full 
implementation periods on hospital service utilization such as readmission rate, ED visits, 
and hospital spending.  
Previous evaluations for the pilot model (with the implementation period as of 
2010-2013) using difference-in-differences designs and within-state control group found 
no significant effects on readmission rates or acute hospital stays among Medicare 
beneficiaries with an 18 and 36 month follow-up period  (Mortensen, Perman, and Chen 
2014; Roberts, Hatfield, et al. 2018). Two recent studies using all-payer claims and 
within-state controls found reductions in different hospital departments evaluating the 
whole implementation period (Done, Herring, and Xu 2019; Pines et al. 2019). Done et al. 
(2019) found a significant 8.9% reduction in outpatient visits using rural untreated Zip 
Code Tabulation Areas as the control group. Pines et al. (2019) found a 12% decline in 
ED admission, a 23% decline in non-ED admissions, a 45% decrease in ambulatory 
surgery center visits, and a 40% reduction in outpatient clinic visits and services using 
seven similar non-TPR hospitals in Maryland as the control group.   
Evaluations of the formal GBR program using a difference-in-differences 
approach and across-state control group yielded mixed results on hospital service 
utilization (e.g., admission and readmission, ED visits, and outpatient department 
utilization) for the Medicare population (Giuriceo et al. 2017, 2018; Roberts, McWilliams, 




where all-cause acute inpatient admissions per 1,000 patients decreased nearly 5%, 
ambulatory care sensitive condition admissions per 1,000 decreased 9.4%, and per capita 
expenditures for inpatient, outpatient, ED visits, and observation stay all decreased 
(Giuriceo et al. 2018). Meanwhile, Roberts et al. (2018) showed evidence that evaluation 
results on primary care visits, hospital stays, ED visits, return hospital stays, hospital 
outpatient department use, and post-hospitalization primary care visits are not stable 
across different model specifications. For instance, there was a relative increase in 
primary care visits with no reduction in hospital stays in a parsimonious model that 
included only the difference-in-difference interaction terms and area and year fixed 
effects. However, adding linear trends that were specific to Maryland and the comparison 
group, there was a reduction in hospital stays with no increase in primary care (Roberts, 
McWilliams, et al. 2018). It is impossible to know with certainty which model is superior 
as it depends on which models’ un-testable assumptions are more accurate. For 
commercial plan members, RTI found significant reductions in ED visits, potentially 
avoidable admissions, and unexpected reduction in admission severity by December 2017 
(Giuriceo et al. 2019).  
In summary, a certain level of inconsistency exists among these studies. The 
inconsistency may arise from differences in study population (RTI used all 46 hospitals 
while Roberts et al., used only 36 urban hospitals), choices on comparison group (RTI 
used matched hospitals while Roberts et al., used matched counties), and the evaluation 
time range (RTI's results were through 3 years implementation while Roberts et al., used 




technical issues that come along with the difference-in-differences method, such as serial 
correlations or the violation of parallel trend assumption.  
Studies using less robust study designs have found more consistently positive 
results. In 2014, the annual growth of per capita hospital costs for all payers increased by 
2.11% and Medicare costs decreased by 1.08%; the inpatient admissions per 1,000 
Medicare beneficiaries decreased by nearly 5%; the rate of 65 potentially preventable 
conditions (PPC) dropped by 26.3%; and the Medicare all-cause readmission rate 
dropped by 0.2% in Maryland compared to the national average (Patel et al. 2015). While 
such results are certainly compelling, it is unclear if the pre-period experience is the right 
counterfactual for what would have happened in the absence of the program. Nonetheless, 
from the HSCRC report in 2018, hospitals fulfilled all the requirements after four years 
of implementation of the GBR program. Specifically, as measured in 2017, all-payer 
hospital revenue growth was 3.54%; Medicare savings in hospital expenditure was 5.63% 
lower than the national average growth rate from the 2013 base year; Medicare savings in 
the total cost of care was 1.36% lower than the national average; all-payer quality 
improvement reductions in PPCs under Maryland Hospital-Acquired Conditions (MHAC) 
program met a 50% reduction; readmission reductions for Medicare were 0.19% below 
the national average, and 100% of hospitals transferred revenue to globally based 
(HSCRC 2018a). On the other hand, hospitals have made some changes to reduce 
admissions, such as working with nonprofit health services providers to visit patients at 
home for those who visit ED frequently or discharging patients into long-term care 




1.2 Conceptual Framework 
I provide an illustrative conceptual framework to think about how the Maryland 
Global Budget Revenue Program might influence NICU admission and utilization (e.g. 
length of stay) decisions. With the rapid increase in numbers of NICUs and numbers of 
NICU beds, the availability of bed supply may directly lead to additional utilization 
(Roemer 1961). Evidence supports this theory as Freedman exploited short-run within-
hospital-month deviations in the number of empty beds using data from California (1991-
2001) and New York (1994-2003) and found a causal effect of higher NICU bed supply 
on admission for low birthweight (1500g-2500g) newborns rather than very low 
birthweight (<1500g) (Freedman 2016b). Harrison et al., (2018) conducted a descriptive 
study using US birth certificates (2013) and American Hospital Association (2012) data 
that found that newborns’ admissions to NICUs were positively correlated with NICU 
bed supply (W. N. Harrison, Wasserman, and Goodman 2018). Although the evidence 
suggested overutilization of NICU service in areas with more bed supply, it’s not 
practical to shut down these NICUs to reduce unnecessary utilization and cost. 
Maryland’s all-payer reform, therefore, offers a potential solution to contain the 
utilization and cost within a reasonable range. This study is also motivated by the 
“financially sensitive” feature of the NICU where it’s known as one of the major profit 
centers for hospitals. A 2010 Health Affairs article that profiled one academic medical 
center found that NICU admissions made up just for 4% of total hospital admissions but 
accounted for 69% of net profits (Lantos 2010). In the next section, I will further discuss 
how Maryland’s GBR offers economic incentives that could drive the change in 




Here, I introduce a weighted utility function model suggested by McGuire (2000) 
and Freedman (2016). The doctor acts as the key decision-maker (the hospital is assumed 
to face similar incentives as suggested by literature) and will maximize his/her utility by 
considering his/her own welfare as well as the patient's welfare within a weighted 
function in (1.1) where the weight 𝛼 > 0. That is, the doctor improves utility when he/she 
provides additional services to patients while the corresponding harm to patients (such as 
financial loss, mental stress, or adverse medical events) will decrease his/her utility. The 
utility gained from NICU admission varies with a series of infant risk factors, such as 
birthweight, gestational age, etc. For simplicity and following previous literature, I use a 
single index b that quantifies risk on a continuum. Therefore, the doctor must choose an 
optimal threshold on b that will lead to NICU admission when crossed. The value of the 
threshold, called b*, is chosen to maximize his/her utility within a constrained choice set 
(0, B(capacity)). The upper limit of the choice set is bounded by capacity, which may 
include hospital bed supply and all other hospital resource constraints. Let 𝑈(𝑏) be the 
overall utility of a doctor admitting a newborn into the NICU, which equals a weighted 
sum of doctor’s payoff 𝑈𝑑(𝑏) and patient’s payoff 𝑈𝑝(𝑏): 
                            𝑈(𝑏) = 𝛼𝑈𝑑(𝑏) + (1 − 𝛼)𝑈𝑝(𝑏) + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡                  (1.1)                                           
                         𝑈′(𝑏) = 𝛼𝑈𝑑
′ (𝑏) + (1 − 𝛼)𝑈𝑃
′ (𝑏),                                      








≤ 0.  
The payoffs of admitting a newborn for both doctor and newborn are assumed to 
increase with higher risk factors. If 𝑈′(𝑏) > 0, the doctor will admit the newborn into the 




then the doctor is indifferent between admitting the newborn or not. 𝑏∗ is the threshold 
where the doctor is indifferent between admitting the newborn or not. If taken b as 
birthweight, then newborns weighing less than b* will get admitted while those 
weighting more than b* won’t.  
The theory of “supplier-induced demand” is supported by literature investigating 
the availability-effect or fee-effect (Mcguire 2000). While evidence of the fee-effect is 
mostly found in Medicare plans where the fee and reimbursement structure is observable, 
literature in NICU focuses on the availability-effect because of the dramatic capacity 
increase of NICU beds in the US since the 1980s when it’s likely that demand is 
oversupplied. Freedman (2016) suggested three mechanisms that might lead 𝑏∗ to change 
with NICU bed capacity. They are the Income Effect: As empty beds increase, physicians 
see this as a negative income shock and they are more willing to raise 𝑏∗ to compensate 
their income loss; Option Value: As there are more empty beds available, the opportunity 
cost of admitting a heavier infant decrease so raising 𝑏∗  may bring more benefit to 
physicians; and Congestion Externalities: As capacity increases, the spillover effects of 
“quality of care” is decreasing given physician and nurse resources are less congested, 
and this may allow physicians to be more likely to admit a marginal infant. 
Similarly, I suggest some mechanisms that the GBR program might change the 
threshold of  𝑏∗ (where 𝑈′(𝑏∗) = 0). I assume that the utility functional form won’t be 
affected by GBR. The capacity of NICUs (measured by NICU beds) stay relatively stable 
in Maryland during my study period (<3.1% change from 2010 to 2015) (Giuriceo et al. 




Case I: The b* is below the upper bound B(capacity) before GBR. Given that total 
spending growth is capped at 3.58%, it's possible that every hospital department is 
required to constrain their utilization to avoid over-spending, which gives practitioners 
incentives to admit fewer infants that would otherwise be admitted. Hence, this can be 
seen as the choice set shrinks due to GBR and I should observe a decrease or no change 
in 𝑏∗. On the other hand, if GBR does not affect  the neonatal department (i.e., the change 
in the budget is not binding on the NICU) and practitioners are allowed to make their 
own admission decisions, then either the choice set is unchanged or expanded and the 
admission of infants won't be affected at all. In this case, I should observe no changes in 
𝑏∗. 
Case II: The b* is bounded by B(capacity). In this case, the choice of b* follows 
the change of B(capacity). GBR might lead to shrinking, expansion, or no change of the 
choice set through affecting the hospital's investment in infrastructure. Correspondingly, 
b* will decrease, be unchanged, or increase.  
I provided some evidence that Case I is probably the correct case, i.e., there will 
be an interior solution rather than a corner solution. I examined the occupancy rate of 
NICU in Maryland before GBR. Specifically, I calculated the occupancy rate by dividing 
NICU days by NICU bed days available (Halpern et al. 2016) using 2014 SID files from 
the HCUP discharge data (HCUP 2019a) and the number of NICU beds from the FY2015 
MHCC’s report (Maryland Health Care Commission 2015). I found an average 
occupancy rate of 39.9%. Similarly, Freedman also suggested that capacity constraints 
and congestion externalities are not the reasons that drove NICU admissions using data 




adjust prices within a certain range. Under GBR, hospitals might decrease NICU 
admissions and choose to increase the price of NICU (Giuriceo et al. 2016). The hospital 
doesn't have incentives to decrease prices in this circumstance. Therefore, the effect of a 
price change will fall into Case I. Moreover, it’s possible that doctors are not employed 
by the hospital to do the admitting. In this case, GBR won't affect them, and the 
admission rate shouldn't be affected.  
1.3 A Preview of Chapters Two, Three, and Four 
In Chapter Two, I examine the impact of GBR on the Neonatal Intensive Care 
Unit (NICU) admissions and infant mortality. The NICU is a particular medical 
technology that is characterized by high prices and potentially inefficient utilization. I 
apply a difference-in-difference design comparing Maryland to 20 states (including DC) 
before and after the GBR. I use the restricted-use birth certificates data from the Vital 
Statistics, which collects demographic and clinical information of newborns and mothers 
from a near census of births in the US. I find that the GBR is associated with a 16.8% 
(1.26 percentage points, bootstrap p-value=0.03) decrease in the NICU admission rate. 
The decline is primarily driven by infants that were relatively low-risk, corresponding to 
birthweight above 1,500g or gestational age >32 weeks. There's no impact of GBR on 
neonatal or infant mortality rate. These findings suggest substantial potential savings in 
neonatal hospital services after capping hospital revenues, which can be achieved without 
decreasing measurable care quality. The lessons from Maryland could help those states 





Chapter Three expands the analysis to broader hospital services related to births. 
In this chapter, I examine the impact of GBR on lengths of stay (LOS), total cost of care, 
and specific services utilization of infants. I use the inpatient discharge data from the 
Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP), comparing Maryland with New York, 
New Jersey, and Kentucky through a difference-in-differences design. I find that GBR is 
associated with a decline in total LOS and the utilization of a series of neonatal services 
for newborns. These findings are a supplement to current findings on the effect of GBR 
on aggregate outcomes and shed light on an essential population that is mainly financed 
by Medicaid and private insurance.  
Chapter Four redirects to NICU service and further explores the variation in 
NICU utilization that is related to another source of financial incentive – insurance 
coverage. In this chapter, I used the nationwide birth certificate data, including all states 
and DC, to describe the overall variation in NICU admissions across insurance type, and 
then stratified by birthweight. I find a significant variation in NICU use between 
Medicaid and privately insured patients. However, the variation is gone after adjusting 
for infant risk among the very-low birthweight infants that need intensive services the 
most. Nevertheless, the variation persists for normal birthweight infants that were 
relatively healthy. Although these findings are descriptive, they suggest a great amount of 
variation that is not attributed to the demand-side when the infant risk factors and 






Chapter 2 : Changes in NICU Admissions after Maryland’s 




The U.S. is engaged in a number of payment reform activities that are designed to 
constrain health care cost growth (Center for Medicare & Medicaid Innovation 2018). 
One of the most ambitious state-based programs is Maryland’s Global Budget Revenue 
(GBR) program, which prospectively sets global budgets for every acute-care hospital in 
the state (CMS 2018). With a fixed budget encompassing revenues from inpatient, 
outpatient, emergency department, and hospital-based ambulatory surgery centers, and 
penalties for deviation of more than 0.5%, hospitals are now incentivized to limit 
volumes and substitute high-cost services for low-cost population health investments. A 
pilot version of the program was introduced in rural hospitals in 2010. The formal model, 
i.e., the GBR program, was then launched statewide in January 2014. With a short 
transition period, all 46 acute-care hospitals in Maryland were operating under a global 
budget setting from July 2014 (Giuriceo et al. 2016).  
Comprehensive evaluations of both the intended and unintended consequences of 
GBR are crucial for policymakers refining the global budget model. Lessons from 
Maryland are also essential for other states that now considering the global budget, such 
as Pennsylvania and Vermont (CMS 2019b, 2019c). Prior findings on GBR are mixed for 
changes in aggregate hospital utilization, including inpatient admission and readmission, 




Hatfield, et al. 2018; Mortensen, Perman, and Chen 2014; Done, Herring, and Xu 2019; 
Pines et al. 2019; Giuriceo et al. 2019, 2016, 2017, 2018). Moreover, the studies on GBR 
have predominantly focused on Medicare beneficiaries (Roberts, McWilliams, et al. 2018; 
Beil et al. 2019). Evidence from other populations and focusing specifically on distinct 
high-cost services is lacking.  
This study considers a previously unexamined service: Neonatal Intensive Care 
Units (NICU). NICUs are highly effective for infants that need them but are costly (Scott 
A. Lorch et al. 2012; Phibbs et al. 2007). NICU services are also sensitive to financial 
incentives. Recent work has found positive relationships between NICU admissions with 
bed supply and low unit census (Freedman 2016a; W. N. Harrison, Wasserman, and 
Goodman 2018; Goodman et al. 2019; J. Schulman et al. 2018). These correlations are 
largest among infants who do not appear to possess clear clinical indicators of need, 
suggesting that not all infants treated in the NICU require it and that some infants might 
be adequately cared for outside of the NICU. 
In this study, I estimate the association of the GBR program with NICU 
utilization and investigate how the associations vary across birthweight and gestational 
age categories. While the hope is that hospitals will substitute unnecessary high-cost care 
with lower-cost alternatives that produce equal or superior health outcomes, the program 
may inadvertently reduce services in ways that decrease health. To measure this dynamic, 
I also explore the association of GBR with infant and neonatal mortality rates.  
I use a difference-in-differences design comparing Maryland with 20 states 
(including DC) before and after the implementation of GBR. Data comes from restricted-




years of implementation, a longer implementation period that has been observed by 
previous GBR studies.   
2.2 Methods 
2.2.1 Study Design 
I used a difference-in-differences approach to compare NICU admission among 
newborns in Maryland versus newborns in other states, before (2011-2014) and after 
(2015-2017) the implementation of the GBR program (Dimick and Ryan 2014). To 
interpret these estimates as causal effects, one must assume that Maryland would have 
followed the same trend as the comparison states in the absence of the program. 
Comparison states included 19 states and the District of Columbia that collected NICU 
admission information on their birth certificate forms and adopted the ACA Medicaid 
Expansion as Maryland did. The full list of comparison states is provided in Table A.1 
(Appendix A). While hospitals were subject to global budgets at the start of the Fiscal 
Year 2014 (July 2014) and applied penalties since Fiscal Year 2015, I specified that the 
post-intervention period started in 2015 which was the first full calendar year of the 
program implementation.  
The American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) recommends NICU admission for 
all very-low birthweight infants (weighing less than 1,500 grams) and very preterm 
infants (born before  32 weeks of gestation) (American Academy of Pediatrics 2012; 
Kilpatrick, Papile, and Macones 2017). Fewer infants above these thresholds are likely to 
need NICU care, and NICU utilization for such infants has been shown to be sensitive to 




American Academy of Pediatrics 2012; J. Schulman et al. 2018; Angert and Adam 2008; 
Cloherty et al. 2012). I hypothesized that GBR would only affect NICU admission rates 
among higher weight and longer gestation infants that are more likely to be safely treated 
outside of the NICU setting. I conducted subgroup analyses by birthweight and gestation 
using commonly used categories (defined below) (Freedman 2016a; W. Harrison and 
Goodman 2015; Kilpatrick, Papile, and Macones 2017).  
In my secondary analyses, I assessed whether GBR led to changes in infant and 
neonatal mortality rates. Neonatal mortality (death in the first 28 days) is likely to be 
more sensitive to NICU care than infant mortality (death in the first year) (Goodman et 
al. 2002; WHO 2007). Mortality analyses were conducted for all infants, for moderately-
low and normal birthweight infants, and for moderately preterm and term infants. Within 
each group, I considered all infants in the category and infants not admitted into a NICU. 
If GBR reduced NICU care among infants who needed it, then I expected that the largest 
increase in mortality would be for those not admitted to a NICU.  
2.2.2 Data  
I used data from restricted-use Vital Statistics which comprise a near census of 
live births from 2011 to 2017 (CDC 2019). I obtained state of birth, NICU admission 
status, and infant and maternal characteristics from the Birth Files. I used state-of-birth 
rather than state of mother’s residence because, with some exceptions, GBR budgets are 
determined by the amount of care provided to both in-state and out-of-state residents. 
Mortality was obtained from the Linked Birth-Death Files. The sample included all 




characteristics obtained from the Area Health Resources Files (HRSA 2019), Kaiser 
Family Foundation (KFF 2017), and CDC Wonder (CDC 2018).  
2.2.3 Study Variables 
The primary outcome was an indicator of NICU admission status. NICU 
admission in the Birth Files is defined as “Admission into a facility or unit staffed and 
equipped to provide continuous mechanical ventilatory support for the newborn” (Center 
for Health Statistics 2003). Importantly, this indicator measures the admission of an 
infant to a certain clinical setting, but does not necessarily indicate the types of care that 
the infant received. I grouped infants into four birthweight categories: very-low (VLBW, 
500-1,499g), moderately-low (MLBW, 1,500-2,499g), normal (NBW, 2,500-3,999g), and 
high (HBW, 4,000g and above) (W. Harrison and Goodman 2015). Separately, I also 
grouped the sample into four gestation categories: very preterm (<32 weeks), moderately 
preterm (32-36 weeks), term (37-41 weeks), and postterm (>41 weeks) (Kilpatrick, 
Papile, and Macones 2017). I measured infant and neonatal mortality rates as the number 
of deaths per 1,000 live births per state-year (M. H. Boudreaux, Dagher, and Lorch 
2018). 
The covariates in the individual-level NICU admission analysis included infant 
characteristics: birthweight, gestational age, gender, and an indicator of any congenital 
anomaly; and a set of maternal characteristics: race/ethnicity, age, education, insurance 
type, parity, an indicator of any maternal morbidity, an indicator of any maternal 
infection during pregnancy, and an indicator of any risk factor during pregnancy. The 
maternal characteristics were used to adjust for changes in health risks at the time of 




unemployment rates, birth rates, and the number of NICU beds per 1,000 residents to 
control for changes in the supply of NICU services. Further details about covariates are 
described in Appendix A. 
In the aggregate-level mortality analyses, I controlled for the percent of infants 
that were moderately-low birthweight, preterm, and had any congenital anomalies; 
percent of mothers that were non-Hispanic White, aged less than 35 years, had less than 
high school education, first births, had any maternal morbidities, had any infections 
during pregnancy, had any risk factors during pregnancy, and the state-level 
characteristics as above. 
2.2.4 Statistical Analysis 
I implemented the difference-in-differences comparison in a linear regression 
framework. Individual-level NICU admissions were modeled using linear probability 
models and aggregate-level mortality rates with linear regressions. Linear models were 
chosen due to the ease of interpreting the coefficients. However, we come to similar 
results using logistic regressions (Table A.6). The models controlled for the covariates 
described above in addition to state and year fixed effects. State fixed effects accounted 
for unobserved state-specific factors that were stable over time and the year fixed effects 
controlled for year-specific changes that were common for all states. 95% confidence 
intervals were obtained from the clustered sandwich estimator to account for state 
clustering. I also report P-values that were obtained from a bootstrap method that better 
accounted for serial correlation in the presence of a single treated cluster (Ferman and 




𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡= 𝛿 (𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛t𝑠 * 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡) + 𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝛽1 + 𝑍𝑠𝑡 𝛽2+ 𝑢𝑠 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑡 
Where 𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 is the indicator of NICU admission, 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 is a dummy variable for 
whether it’s the post-intervention period, 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛t𝑠 is a dummy variable indicating 
whether the unit is treated in the post-intervention period,   𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 is a vector of individual-
level covariates, 𝑍𝑠𝑡 is a vector of state-by-year level covariates, 𝑢𝑠 is a vector of state 
fixed effects that control for time-invariant characteristics within a state, 𝛾𝑡 is a vector of 
year fixed effects that control for state-invariant changes across years, and 𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑡 is the error 
term. 𝛿 is the DID estimate of the policy effect that estimates the mean difference in 
outcomes between Maryland and comparison states, before and after the year 2015. A 
similar strategy was used to model state-year infant mortality rates. 
I conducted additional analyses to determine if these results were sensitive to 
reasonable alterations in approach. I first examined if I came to similar conclusions using 
alternative comparison groups, different covariates, different post-period definitions, 
using state of residence rather than state of birth, restricting to births that occurred in 
urban hospitals, or adding state-specific linear trends. I also examined results after 
excluding Baltimore City and Baltimore County where a local initiative was launched in 
2009 to reduce infant mortality (Baltimore City Health Department 2009). I considered 
alternative specifications such as logistic regression for binary outcomes. I also examined 
if GBR led to changes in health at birth to better understand if any changes I observed in 
NICU admission could have possibly resulted from changes to infant health. To measure 
health at birth, I used an indicator of preterm, an indicator of small for gestational age, 
detailed birthweight in grams, and weeks of gestation. Finally, I used a data-driven 




using the difference-in-differences. Details regarding these sensitivity analyses are 
provided in Appendix A. Analyses were conducted using Stata version 15 (StataCorp). 
Data analysis was approved by the University of Maryland Institutional Review Board 
(IRB). 
2.3 Results 
2.3.1 Newborn Characteristics 
I observed a total of 11,965,997 newborns in Maryland and the comparison states. 
Baseline (2011-2014) characteristics are presented in Table 2.1. Most covariates were 
qualitatively similar between Maryland and the comparison states, although Maryland 
had a higher proportion of infants born to non-Hispanic Black mothers, a lower 
proportion born to Hispanic mothers, and a smaller Medicaid population. Hence, I did a 
balancing test for problematic compositional changes. Specifically, I replaced the 
outcome variable with the covariate and fitted the standard DID regression model, and 
then I examined whether the magnitude of delta (𝛿) is small and not significant. As 
shown in Table A.13, I found that the differences of most covariates are stable over time. 
The two exceptions were race and insurance type. We can see that the race distributions 
were quite stable in Maryland and the comparison group, but the Hispanic population 
increased by 3 percent in Maryland while almost unchanged in comparison states. Also, 
the Medicaid population increased more in Maryland after the intervention compared to 
the comparison states. While significant, the differences were relatively small in 
magnitude. And we will see later in the results section that these differences in covariates 
are much smaller compared to the size of the program’s effects and they’re not possible 
















Non-Hispanic White 47.66 54.17 
 
Non-Hispanic Black 30.94 10.86 
 
Non-Hispanic Other 7.97 9.48 
 
Hispanic 13.43 25.49 
 
Maternal Age, years 
  
<0.001 
<20 5.74 6.89 
 
20-24 18.97 21.73 
 
25-34 57.4 55.27 
 
35-44 17.65 15.93 
 
45+ 0.24 0.18 
 
Maternal Education  
  
<0.001 
Less than High School 13.28 16.72 
 
High School 20.81 24.32 
 
Some College 27.98 28.58 
 
University and Above 37.93 30.38 
 
Maternal Insurance  
  
<0.001 
Medicaid 33.44 43.38 
 
Private Insurance 57.72 49.53 
 
Self-Pay 3.31 3.05 
 





First 41.58 40.48 
 
Second 33.21 31.84 
 
Third or Higher 25.21 27.67 
 
Any Indications of Maternal 
Infection 
2.35 2.14 <0.001  
Any Indications of Maternal 
Morbidity 
2.43 1.6 <0.001 
Any Indications of Maternal 
Pregnancy Risk 
30.56 27.25 <0.001 
Infant Characteristics 
   
Any Indications of Congenital 
Anomaly 
0.32 0.3 0.068 




Very-Low 1.09 0.86 
 
Moderately-Low 5.41 4.83 
 
Normal 85.04 85.63 
 











Gestational Age  
  
<0.001 
Very Preterm 1.26 1 
 
Moderately Preterm 6.65 6.13 
 
Term 91.77 92.38 
 
Postterm 0.32 0.49 
 
State Characteristics 
   
Poverty Rate 8 12.89 <0.001 
Unemployment Rate 6.71 8.41 <0.001 
Birth Rate 12.32 12.44 <0.001 
NICU Bed, per 1,000 pop 0.07 0.06 <0.001 
Note. The sample excludes those with birthweight less than 500g or unknown, 
non-singleton births, and those with missing values. The baseline period is from 
2011 to 2014. Comparison states include 19 states and the District of Columbia 
that collected NICU admission information in our study period and adopted the 
ACA Medicaid Expansion as Maryland did. The full list of comparison states is 
provided in Appendix A (Table A1). The birthweight categories were defined as: 
very-low birthweight (VLBW, 500-1,499g), moderately-low birthweight 
(MLBW, 1,500-2,499g), normal birthweight (NBW, 2,500-3,999g), and high 
birthweight (HBW, 4,000g and above). The gestation categories were defined as: 
very preterm (<32 weeks), moderately preterm (32-36 weeks), term (37-41 
weeks), and postterm (>41 weeks). 
2.3.2 NICU Utilization 
Before the implementation of GBR, the overall NICU admission rate in Maryland 
increased steadily from 7.28 per 100 births in 2011 to 7.86 in 2014 (Figure 2.1Figure 2.1: 
Unadjusted Trends in NICU Admission: Maryland versus the Comparison States-A). 
Similar trends occurred in the comparison group. After the implementation of GBR, the 
overall NICU admission rate in Maryland decreased from 7.86 in 2014 to 6.79 in 2017, 
while NICU admissions continued to increase in the comparison states.  
Figure 2.1-B  and Figure 2.1-C suggested relatively large declines in NICU 
admission rates in Maryland among MLBW, NBW, and HBW infants, and among 




did not observe a similar pattern for VLBW or very preterm infants. I observed similar 
trends before GBR in both Maryland and the comparisons states among most birthweight 
and gestation groups so that the parallel trends assumption, as required of difference-in-
differences designs, was met. Additional analyses (Table A.2 in Appendix A) confirmed 
that trends in Maryland before GBR were statistically similar to trends in the comparison 
states. The exception was for the very-low birthweight group in which pre-period 
admissions in Maryland appeared to be increasing at a slightly faster rate than the 
comparison states. While this difference in pre-trends did not appear to be large enough 
to be of substantive concern, results for the VLWB group should be interpreted with 
caution. 















C. By Gestational Age
 
Note. Comparison states included 19 states and DC. The birthweight categories were 
defined as: very-low birthweight (500-1,499g), moderately-low birthweight (1,500-
2,499g), normal birthweight (2,500-3,999g), and high birthweight (4,000g and above). 
The gestation categories were defined as: very preterm (, <32 weeks), moderately preterm 
(32-36 weeks), term (37-41 weeks), and postterm (>41 weeks). 
 
Table 2.2 and Table 2.3 describe the adjusted difference-in-differences results for 
all births and for each birthweight and gestation category. The model suggests that GBR 
was associated with a 1.26 percentage points (-16.8%; 95% CI, -1.76 to -0.76; P=.03) 
decline in NICU admission (Table 2.2). The association among MLBW and NBW infants 
was -4.5 percentage points (-12.0%; 95% CI, -5.71 to -3.29; P=.003) and -1.1 percentage 
points (-23.1%; 95% CI, -1.58 to -0.62; P=.04), respectively. Similarly, in Table 2.3, I 




moderately pre-term (-15.5%; 95% CI, -7.06 to -4.23; P=.01) and term (-22.3%; 95% CI, 
-1.45 to -0.52; P=.05) infants. Conversely, I observed small and non-significant 
associations for VLBW and very preterm infants. Changes among HBW and postterm 
infants were relatively large but not statistically significant (-14.2%/14.8%; 95% CI, -
1.36 to -0.31/0.17 to 1.64; P=.13/.43).  
2.3.3 Infant Mortality 
As shown in Table 2.4, GBR did not have a statistically significant association 
with infant and neonatal mortality rates overall, among all MLBW and NBW infants, 
among moderately preterm and term infants, or among such infants that were not 
admitted into a NICU. Although not statistically significant, the point estimates suggested 
a reduction in mortality for all groups considered. In Appendix A, I present additional 




Table 2.2: Effect of GBR on NICU Admissions, Overall and By Birthweight, 2011-2017 
  Maryland  Comparison States  
Adjust Difference-
in-Differences 























    
    
       
  
  
All (N=11,965,997) 7.5 7.3 -0.2 6.9 7.8 0.9 -1.26 (-1.76,-0.76) 0.03 -16.80% 
           By Birthweight 
 
         





      
Moderately-Low Birthweight 37.4 35.7 -1.7 39.4 42.1 2.7 -4.5 (-5.71,-3.29) 0.003 -12.00% 
N=591,120 
 
     
   
 
Normal Birthweight 4.8 4.5 -0.3 4.5 5.1 0.6 -1.1 (-1.58,-0.62) 0.04 -23.10% 
N=10,238,271 
 
     
   
 
High Birthweight 5.9 6.2 0.3 5.5 6.4 0.9 -0.84 (-1.36,-0.31) 0.13 -14.20% 
N=1,032,250                     
Note. Estimates are from separate regressions for all births and for each birthweight group. The coefficients are in percentage points. The models 
control for birthweight (in full and gestation analyses), gestational age (in full and birthweight analyses), mother's age, race, education level, 
insurance type, parity, maternal morbidities, infections, and risks, infant's sex and congenital anomalies, state-level poverty rate, unemployment 
rate, birth rate, NICU bed per 1,000 population, and state and year fixed effects. N denotes the number of observations. The birthweight categories 
were defined as: very-low birthweight (500-1,499g), moderately-low birthweight (1,500-2,499g), normal birthweight (2,500-3,999g), and high 
birthweight (4,000g and above). The gestation categories were defined as: very preterm (< 32 weeks), moderately preterm (32-36 weeks), term 
(37-41 weeks), and postterm (>41 weeks). Comparison states included 19 states and DC. Confidence intervals are based on standard errors that are 
clustered at the state level. P-values are obtained using a bootstrap approach, developed by Ferman and Pinto (2019) that better accounts for serial 





Table 2.3: Effect of GBR on NICU Admissions, By Gestational Age, 2011-2017 
  Maryland  Comparison States  
Adjust Difference-
in-Differences 






















    
    
By Gestational Age 
          
Very Preterm 80.2 84.8 4.6 82.6 86.1 3.5 0.47 (-1.02,1.95) 0.78 0.60% 
N=120,041 
      
   
 
Moderately Preterm 36.4 34.5 -1.9 38.8 42.6 3.7 -5.65 (-7.06,-4.23) 0.01 -15.50% 
N= 744,512 
 
     
   
 
Term 4.4 4.2 -0.2 4 4.6 0.6 -0.98 (-1.45,-0.52) 0.05 -22.30% 
N=11,047,339 
 
     
   
 
Post-term 4.9 6.2 1.2 5.5 5.9 0.4 0.73 (-0.17,1.64) 0.43 14.80% 
N=  54,105                     
Note. Estimates are from separate regressions for each gestation group. The coefficients are in percentage points. The models control for 
birthweight (in full and gestation analyses), gestational age (in full and birthweight analyses), mother's age, race, education level, insurance type, 
parity, maternal morbidities, infections, and risks, infant's sex and congenital anomalies, state-level poverty rate, unemployment rate, birth rate, 
NICU bed per 1,000 population, and state and year fixed effects. N denotes the number of observations. The birthweight categories were defined 
as: very-low birthweight (500-1,499g), moderately-low birthweight (1,500-2,499g), normal birthweight (2,500-3,999g), and high birthweight 
(4,000g and above). The gestation categories were defined as: very preterm (< 32 weeks), moderately preterm (32-36 weeks), term (37-41 weeks), 
and postterm (>41 weeks). Comparison states included 19 states and DC. Confidence intervals are based on standard errors that are clustered at the 
state level. P-values are obtained using a bootstrap approach, developed by Ferman and Pinto (2019) that better accounts for serial correlation. The 




Table 2.4: Effect of GBR on Infant/Neonatal Mortality Rates, 2011-2017 

























        
Infant Mortality Rate           
All 4.22 4.05 -0.17 3.99 3.85 -0.14 -0.19 (-0.47,0.09) 0.28 -5.50% 
Among MLBW and NBW Infants           
Overall 2.62 2.71 0.09 2.77 2.74 -0.03 -0.06 (-0.29,0.17) 0.7 -2.30% 
Not NICU Admitted 2.81 2.9 0.09 2.96 2.95 -0.01 -0.17 (-0.40,0.06) 0.2 -6.10% 
Among MPT and Term Infants           
Overall 2.45 2.57 0.12 2.61 2.58 -0.03 -0.01 (-0.25,0.22) 0.9 -0.40% 
Not NICU Admitted 2.62 2.74 0.12 2.79 2.78 -0.01 -0.11 (-0.35,0.13) 0.25 -4.20% 
Neonatal Mortality Rate           
All 2.45 2.27 -0.18 2.29 2.17 -0.12 -0.15 (-0.41,0.11) 0.23 -6.10% 
Among MLBW and NBW Infants 
          
Overall 1.11 1.14 0.03 1.23 1.21 -0.02 -0.03 (-0.20,0.14) 0.74 -2.70% 
Not NICU Admitted 1.19 1.22 0.03 1.31 1.3 -0.01 -0.06 (-0.26,0.15) 0.58 -5.00% 
Among MPT and Term Infants 
          
Overall 0.96 1.05 0.09 1.14 1.11 -0.03 0.01 (-0.17.0.19) 0.85 1.00% 
Not NICU Admitted 1.03 1.12 0.09 1.21 1.2 -0.01 -0.01 (-0.25,0.23) 0.85 -1.00% 
Note. Infant mortality rate is the number of deaths per 1,000 live births at the state-year level. Neonatal mortality rate is the number of neonatal deaths (infant 
age<28 days) per 1,000 live births at the state-year level. There are 147 state-by-year cells in each model. All estimates are weighted by the number of total births 
in each cell. All models control for percents of infants that are moderately-low birthweight, with congenital anomalies, and preterm; percents of mothers that are 
non-Hispanic White, aged less than 35 years old, with less than high school education, with first birth order, have maternal morbidity, had infections during 
pregnancy, had risk factors during pregnancy, state-year level poverty rate, unemployment rate, birth rate, NICU bed per 1,000 population, and state and year 
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. P-values are obtained using a bootstrap approach, developed by Ferman and Pinto (2019). The 
baseline rate refers to the average admission rate before GBR in Maryland which is calculated using data from 2011 to 2014. MLBW refers to moderately-low 




2.3.4 Sensitivity Analyses 
The results of the sensitivity analyses supported our main findings. My findings 
on NICU admission rates remained almost unchanged in magnitude and significance 
when using different comparison states (Table A.4), using January or July of 2014 as the 
start of the post-period (Table A.5), in models with different covariates (Table A.6), 
using logistic regression models (Table A.6), restricting to state residents or urban 
hospital births (Table A.7), or adding state-specific linear trends (Table A.12). The 
reduction in NICU admission became larger after excluding Baltimore City and County 
which also had a local ongoing initiative to reduce infant mortality (Table A.7). However, 
my main conclusions were unaltered. We failed to find evidence that GBR was associated 
with changes in health at birth (Table A.8), suggesting that changes in NICU admission 
were not mediated by changes in clinical need. I came to the same conclusion using the 
synthetic control methods (Section A11 in Appendix A). Further details about the 
sensitivity analysis can be found in Appendix A. 
2.4 Discussion 
In this study, I estimated the impact of Maryland’s Global Budget Revenue 
program on NICU utilization and infant mortality. I found that the implementation of 
GBR was associated with a substantial decrease in NICU admissions in Maryland. The 
difference-in-difference estimate suggests that GBR was associated with approximately 
2,527 fewer NICU admissions between 2015 and 2017, than would have occurred in the 
absence of GBR. Associations were largest for moderately-low and normal birthweight 




evidence that suggests that financial incentives are the most likely to affect NICU 
admissions for infants that do not have clear indicators of clinical need. The reduction in 
NICU care that I observed did not appear to result in worse birth outcomes as measured 
by infant or neonatal mortality rates.  
This study measured changes in NICU admission where the NICU was defined as 
a unit that could provide continuous mechanical ventilatory support. This roughly aligns 
with AAP’s level III-IV nurseries. However, this study did not measure changes in actual 
care delivered to patients and it is possible that while GBR altered the location of where 
care was delivered, it might not alter the content of that care. For that reason, I cannot 
come to any specific conclusions about the potential magnitudes of cost-savings. In 
Chapter Two, I will use hospital discharge data to extend the analysis to the changes in 
care and related costs. 
Previous studies of GBR have come to mixed findings about hospital utilization 
among Medicare beneficiaries. Discrepancies in these results are due to differences in 
how services were defined, the choice of control groups, and the length of evaluation 
periods. One study found no changes in hospital or primary care use after 2 years 
(Roberts, McWilliams, et al. 2018); another found a 4.9% relative reduction in inpatient 
admissions and approximately $554 million savings for hospital services after 3 years 
(Beil et al. 2019). In addition to these evaluations, two recent studies of the rural pilot 
program found reductions in outpatient visits of 9-40 percent but came to inconsistent 





This study focusing on NICU admissions suggests relatively large associations of 
GBR compared to previous studies. This could be attributed to several factors. First, 
unlike previous GBR studies that focused on the Medicare population, my comparison 
group was less affected by national Medicare payment reform activities (e.g., 
Accountable Care Organizations) because I focused on a service that is primarily 
financed by Medicaid and private insurance. This gives me a well-performed 
counterfactual that passes the pre-trend assumption and entitles a lower risk of biased 
estimates. Second, this study also benefits from a long follow-up period relative to 
previous studies. Another potential explanation for why I found relatively large 
associations is that NICU admission decisions are made by physicians who largely 
practice in the hospital and who as hospitals’ employees may have been more sensitive to 
the hospital-based incentives of GBR compared to physicians who often practice outside 
of hospitals, and make admission decisions by themselves (M. Schulman 2003; Freedman 
2016a). Lastly, the NICU is well known as one of the major profit centers for hospitals 
and is documented to be affected by financial incentives (Lantos 2010). This makes it a 
service that is more likely affected by payment reforms like GBR that target high-cost 
services.  
In addition to informing policy discussions about the effects of GBR, my results 
also offer important insights about NICU care. They are consistent with previous studies 
showing that NICU admissions among moderate to low-risk infants are sensitive to 
financial incentives and appear more discretionary than admissions for high-risk infants 
(i.e., birthweight<1500g and gestation<32 weeks) (Freedman 2016a; W. N. Harrison, 




increase in NICU admissions, more than 20% since 2007 (W. Harrison and Goodman 
2015), my findings indicate that NICU care is a place of potential health system savings 
and that reducing NICU utilization among some patient populations can be achieved 
without apparent harm. 
This study had limitations. First, there might be measurement error in the NICU 
admissions indicator obtained from birth certificates. Such errors would be problematic if 
they varied within a state across time. In Figure A.4, I show that NICU admission rates in 
Maryland, as measured from vital statistics, followed a similar trend as admission rates 
estimated from hospital discharge data. While these data sources are not perfectly 
comparable, the similarity of the trends suggests that my estimates were unlikely to be 
solely driven by measurement error (See Section A10 in Appendix A for further details).  
Second, like all quasi-experimental studies, a potential limitation is that unobserved 
factors could be correlated with the timing of GBR implementation. One clear threat 
came from the adoption of Medicaid expansion under the Affordable Care Act in 2014, 
which recent research demonstrates led to improved birth outcomes among African-
American infants (Brown et al. 2019). However, by restricting the comparison group to 
states that adopted the expansion, I limited this concern. Finally, I was unable to detect 
more detailed neonatal risks (e.g. complications of prematurity, neonatal abstinence 
syndrome, etc.) or identify harm other than death given the limited information provided 
in the birth certificate.  
2.5 Conclusion 
Maryland has enacted one of the largest and most innovative payment reform 




altering NICU service patterns in directions consistent with the intentions of the program. 
This is important information for other states that are considering Maryland’s model and 
for national policymakers that have suggested using a global budget model to finance a 





Chapter 3 : The Impact of Maryland’s Global Budget 
Revenue Program on Birth-Related Hospitalization: Length 
of Stay, Cost, and Service Utilization 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I discussed the impact of Maryland’s’ global budget 
revenue (GBR) program on the neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) admissions at the 
population level, using the birth certificate data. My findings suggested a substantial 
decline in NICU admissions after GBR, which was mainly driven by infants with 
relatively higher birthweights or longer gestational ages. In addition, I failed to find 
evidence of changes to mortality rates, suggesting that changes in utilization did not have 
negative health consequences. While these findings add important information to the 
current literature, birth certificate data lack information on specific service intensity 
measures such as actual services received and the costs of care. Evidence on the impact 
of GBR on intensive margins, i.e. services provided during each admission, and on birth-
related hospitalization, which accounted for approximately 10% of total inpatient 
admissions and the most frequent reason for hospital stays (Kowlessar, Jiang, and Steiner 
2013), is still lacking.   
In this paper, I studied changes to length of stay, cost, and neonatal services 
utilization in response to the GBR program which applied capitated annual budget 




This study makes several contributions to the literature. First, it provides the first 
empirical evidence on the impact of GBR on birth-related hospitalization which 
accounted for an essential, steady, and large portion of hospitals’ annual admissions and 
revenues. Second, it considers a critically important patient population: newborns. Third, 
it studies the effect of GBR on a patient population that is half financed by private payers 
and half by Medicaid. GBR dynamics for this mixed payment population may not track 
previous analyses focusing on single payment populations such as Medicare. Finally, 
unlike previous studies that focused on extensive margin changes (i.e., admission), my 
focus on intensive margin effects offers a relatively unique perspective given that 
hospitals respond to financial incentives both on the admission decision and on the care 
provided conditional on admission.  
3.2 Methods 
3.2.1 Study Design 
I used a difference-in-difference approach that compared outcomes in Maryland 
to those in comparison states over four pre-implementation years, 2011-2014, and two 
post-implementation years, 2015-2016. Due to the penalty for underage or overage the 
global budget began in Fiscal Year 2015 (July 2014), and as such, I began the post-period 
in 2015. Results using 2014 as the post-period starting time were also provided in 
Appendix B. The comparison states (New Jersey, New York, and Kentucky) were chosen 
from states that expanded Medicaid at the same time with Maryland, i.e., January 1
st
, 





3.2.2 Data  
The main data used in this study was from the State Inpatient Database (SID) of 
the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) which collected all inpatient care 
records (HCUP 2019a). It encompassed more than 95 percent of all U.S. hospital 
discharges each year. For the purpose of this study, I used SID Files of Maryland, New 
Jersey, New York, and Kentucky from 2011 to 2016. Data from 2017 were not available 
at the time of the writing of this paper. The medical records for mothers and newborns 
were separate in the SID and could not be linked in those states that I used, except for 
New Jersey. This limited my ability to estimate the total cost of birth at the family level, 
which billed separately for mothers and infants. Therefore, in this paper, I focus my 
analysis on infants only. To select the newborn sample, live births of newborns were 
identified using diagnosis codes described in Table B.1 (Appendix B). 
The annual hospital-level “cost-to-charge ratio” supplemental files from the 
HCUP were used to transform hospital charges into actual cost (HCUP 2019b). To 
account for inflation while comparing estimates of costs of inpatient services from 
different years, the medical care component of the Producer Price Index from the U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics was used where costs were adjusted to 2016 US dollars (Dunn, 
Grosse, and Zuvekas 2018; BLS 2019). Given that the U.S. transitioned to the 
International Classification of Diseases, 10th Revision, Clinical Modification/Procedure 
Coding System (ICD-10-CM/PCS) coding scheme on October 1, 2015, I used ICD-9-
CM/PCS for all the data before the third quarter of 2015 and ICD-10-CM/PCS thereafter 




the Kaiser Family Foundation, Area Health Resources Files, and CDC wonder (KFF 
2017; HRSA 2019; CDC 2018; KFF 2019).  
3.2.3 Study Variables 
In this study, I explored a series of utilization measures, including length of stay, 
NICU care (level III&IV nursery), neonatal special care (level II nursery), and certain 
high-cost yet commonly used neonatal services, such as X-ray, ultrasound, CT scan, 
MRI, and respiratory services. I identified the NICU care using revenue codes that 
denoted level III or level IV nursery care (revenue code = 0173 or 0174) (Goodman et al. 
2019). One thing to notice was that the assigned revenue code corresponds to the level of 
care determined during the clinical evaluation rather than the level of facility (Maryland 
Department of Health 2017; New York State Department of Health 2012) . As stated on 
the New York State’s Statewide Planning and Research Cooperative System (New York 
State Department of Health 2012), “The levels of care and resulting revenue codes may, 
and likely will, fluctuate during the infants stay in the facility.” The special care use was 
defined as the use of any level II nursery care (revenue code = 0172). I was also 
interested in examining the number of units used for these services, while given the 
difference in payment systems for Maryland (all-payer) versus other states (IPPS)
1
, the 
units of some services may not be comparable. I did observe large differences in units of 
radiology service utilization. Therefore, indicators of services rather than the units were 
examined in the study. The revenue codes used to measure other services were listed in 
Table B.2 (Appendix B).  
                                                 
1
 Maryland’s all-payer rate-setting system used 51 revenue centers as the basis for payment (HSCRC 2012). 
In contrast, the IPPS categorized inpatient admissions into one of 746 Medicare Severity Diagnosis-Related 




I also examined the total costs of care for each newborn and aggregate inpatient 
costs by the hospital department (i.e., cost center) (Table B.2, Appendix B) (Salemi et al. 
2013). The definitions of terms charge, payment, and cost are different in hospital 
financial settings. The inpatient hospital charge was the price that the hospital billed for 
reimbursement purposes and it varied widely across the U.S. (Health Care Cost Institute 
2019). The charges for neonatal and perinatal services also varied across states and 
hospitals (Hall et al. 2015). Also, the charges may not fully reflect the actual hospital 
services cost where the cost-to-charge ratios also varied across hospitals (HCUP 2019b). 
The actual payment that the hospital received from public and private payers were 
generally much lower than the listed charges/prices (Karaca and Moore 2013; Park, Kim, 
and Werner 2015). The HCUP SID files only contained the amount of charges, rather 
than payments or costs. In other words, I was unable to access the actual payment amount 
a hospital received from payers or the out-of-pocket expenditure of patients. But I was 
able to observe the amount of hospital charges and use the annual hospital-level cost-to-
charge ratios to obtain the actual cost of hospital services. These costs reflect the actual 
hospital expenses including wages, supplies, and utilities, which could serve as a good 
proxy of healthcare spending (Riley 2009; Andrews 2015; HCUP 2019b).  
The HCUP data only provide limited demographic information like other claims 
data. The covariates used in newborn analysis included infants’ sex, race and ethnicity, 
birthweight, the primary payer, median household income as state quartile for patient zip 
code, and an urban-rural indicator (coded as rural if not metropolitan or micropolitan, 
urban otherwise). I also created the gestational age categories, an indicator of having 




codes (Table B.1, Appendix B). An indicator of having any congenital anomaly was also 
created using diagnosis codes from the Clinical Classification Software created by the 
HCUP, which collapsed diagnosis codes and procedure codes into a smaller number of 
clinically meaningful categories (Table B.3, Appendix B).  
I also included time-varying state-level characteristics, including poverty rates, 
unemployment rates, birth rates, and the number of NICU beds per 1,000 residents to 
control for changes in the supply of NICU services.  
3.2.4 Statistical Analysis 
Linear regression models were primarily used for each outcome to facilitate 
complex adjustment for standard error. Non-OLS models were used as supplements 
according to the type of dependent variables. For count data (i.e. length of stay), Poisson 
models were used which had a better fit to the data compared to the negative binomial 
models. The model fit was estimated by comparing the mean differences of observed and 
predicted counts from these two models (Long and Freese 2014). Considering that the 
distribution of cost was skewed, OLS with a log transformation as well as the generalized 
linear model (GLM) with a log link function and the gamma distribution were used 
(Buntin and Zaslavsky 2004). Marginal effects were reported for non-OLS models.  
I estimated the impact of GBR using the following equation (in OLS): 
    𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛿(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 ∙ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡) + 𝑿𝒊𝒔𝒕𝛽 + 𝒁𝒔𝒕𝛽2 + 𝒖𝒔 + 𝜸𝒕 + 𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑡 
 Where 𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 measured cost, length of stay, or service utilization for individual i in 
hospital s at year t. 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 was an indicator for Maryland patients. 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 was an 
indicator of post-implementation years. The coefficient of interest, 𝛿, is the impact of 




effects. The hospital fixed effects controlled for the unobserved hospital-specific factors 
that were stable over time and the year fixed effects controlled for year-specific changes 
that were common for all hospitals. 𝑿𝒊𝒔𝒕 was a vector of individual-level and 𝑍𝑠𝑡 was a 
vector of state-by-year level covariates as described. Other non-OLS models shared the 
same control variables. 
 The standard errors were obtained from the clustered sandwich estimator to 
account for state clustering. However, that approach does not perform well when there 
was only one treated cluster (Ferman and Pinto 2019). To provide supporting evidence on 
the robustness of inference, I also reported P-values that were obtained from a bootstrap 
method that better accounted for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity in the presence 
of a single treated cluster (Ferman and Pinto 2019).  
 While the treatment effects may be heterogeneous across the conditional 
distribution of the outcomes which implied some potential of using a quantile regression 
analysis, I decided to conduct subgroup analysis instead. This is because the reason for 
high-cost or high utilization case related to birth and delivery were highly predictable by 
indicators such as gestational age or birthweight. That is, infants with high cost or high 
utilizations were more likely to be preterm or immature. The subgroup analysis, 
therefore, conveyed more information compared to quantile regression in this case. If I 
observed larger effect among those high-risk cases, I would expect to see larger effects in 
the tail when using a quantile regression. Therefore, I conducted subgroup analysis by 
infant gestational age.  
I conducted several robustness checks. First, I conducted the DID estimates using 




the effects of GBR were mainly driven by actual applied penalties which were started in 
2015, the results using 2014 as the implementation year would facilitate a comparison to 
previous literature. Also, I conducted subgroup analysis by birthweight.  
3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3.1 provides descriptive statistics for infants, with the bootstrap p-value 
from a balancing test. The balancing test was conducted by replacing the outcome 
variable with the covariate and fitted the standard linear DID regression model (Wing, 
Simon, and Bello-Gomez 2018). Then I examined whether the magnitude of delta (δ, the 
DID estimator) is small and not significant. There are some differences between 
Maryland and the comparison states at the baseline period. For example, Maryland has a 
higher percentage of non-Hispanic black infants, and a lower poverty rate. However, the 
strength of the DID design is that all observed and unobserved differences between 
Maryland and comparison hospitals are controlled by the hospital fixed effects in the 
model, as long as these differences are stable over time.  
What matters for the validity of the DID is that the differences between the two 
groups are stable over time and that the changes in treatment exposure are not associated 
with changes in the distribution of covariates. If the covariates are differentially changing 
over time in Maryland hospitals versus the comparison state hospitals, this would not be 
controlled for by the hospital fixed effects. The final column of Table 3.1 presents the p-
value from the balancing test which directly assesses if covariates differences between 





Table 3.1: Characteristics of Infants Before and After GBR, 2011-2016  
  Maryland Comparison States   
Bootstrap 










     <1500g 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.80 
1500-2499g 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.93 
>=2500g 0.91 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.75 
Gestational Age   
     <=32 weeks 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 1.00 
33-36 weeks 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.60 
>=37 weeks 0.91 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.67 
Female 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.59 
Singleton Birth 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.95 
Infant with Respiratory 
Distress Syndrome 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.37 
Infant with Congenital 
Anomaly 0.16 0.08 0.11 0.06 0.12 
Race 
     Non-Hispanic White 0.45 0.44 0.53 0.51 0.04 
Non-Hispanic Black 0.31 0.31 0.13 0.13 0.44 
Non-Hispanic Other 0.12 0.12 0.20 0.21 0.32 
Hispanic 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.80 
Insurance Type 
     Medicaid 0.44 0.44 0.42 0.45 0.42 
Private Insurance 0.52 0.51 0.52 0.48 0.04 
Self-Pay 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.91 
Other  0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.36 
Urban 0.99 0.99 0.96 0.96 0.59 
Median Household Income        
  1st Quartile 0.27 0.28 0.31 0.31 0.56 
2nd Quartile 0.26 0.26 0.24 0.25 0.30 
3rd Quartile 0.27 0.26 0.24 0.23 0.96 
4th Quartile 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.65 
State Characteristics 
     Poverty Rate 8.00 7.50 12.71 11.98 0.40 
Unemployment Rate 6.72 5.30 8.00 5.56 0.08 
Birth Rate 12.32 12.12 12.11 11.82 0.37 
NICU Beds, per 1,000 
Population 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.67 
N 258,977 132,148 1,426,420 721,040   
Note. The sample excludes those with missing values. Comparison states include New 
York, New Jersey, and Kentucky. P-values are obtained using a bootstrap approach, 




I find that most of the covariates’ differences are stable over time. The two 
exceptions are the proportions of infants being non-Hispanic White and covered by 
private insurance. For instance, Maryland and the comparison states both have 52% of 
births covered by private insurance before GBR but the decrease 1 percentage point after 
GBR in Maryland and 3 percentage points in the comparison states. Given that the 
magnitudes of these differences are very small and the significance level is on the 
margin, the effects of these compositional changes are assumed to be ignorable. 
Table 3.2 presents the summary statistics for outcome variables for in Maryland at 
the baseline period. The average length of stay in Maryland before GBR is 3.71 days and 
the average cost of birth is $3811.35 for infants. In addition, 7.66% of infants have used 
NICU care and 6.81% have used special care. The rates of radiology diagnostic and 
imaging service rates are 6.79% and 5.60%, respectively. The rates of using CT scan and 
MRI are relatively small, with 0.15% and 0.29%. Both the NICU care and special care 
may incorporate respiratory services where I observe a 13.35% utilization rate among all 
infants. The C-section rate is 32.69%. 
The categories of gestation are following pediatric guidelines and literature, i.e., 
very-preterm (<=32 weeks), preterm (33-36 weeks), and term (>=37 weeks) (Kilpatrick, 
Papile, and Macones 2017; American Academy of Pediatrics 2012; W. N. Harrison, 
Wasserman, and Goodman 2018; W. Harrison and Goodman 2015). Only 2.19% of 
infants are very preterm (<32 weeks) and the majority of infants are term births. As 
expected, both the LOS and total costs vary greatly across gestations, suggesting that the 
gestational age was a powerful indicator of the relative risk for infants. The average LOS 




infants (>=37 weeks). The average total costs of births for the very-preterm infants are 
$61,222.01 compared to only $2,051.48 among term infants.  
Table 3.2: Outcomes of Infants in Maryland at Baseline, 2011-2014 
Outcomes Sample Size (%) Mean 
Length of Stay, Days     
Overall 258,977 3.71 
Infant Gestation 
  <=32 weeks 5,679 (2.19) 36.74 
33-36 weeks 17,572 (6.79) 7.27 
>=37 weeks 235,726 (91.02) 2.65 
Total Cost, $ 
  Overall 258,977 3,811.35 
Infant Gestation 
  <=32 weeks 5,679 (2.19) 61,222.01 
33-36 weeks 17,572 (6.79) 8,865.43 
>=37 weeks 235,726 (91.02) 2,051.48 
Indicators of Services Use, % 
 
  
NICU Care 258,977 7.66 
Special Care  258,977 6.81 
Radiology Diagnostic 258,977 6.79 
CT Scan 258,977 0.15 
Other Imaging Services 258,977 5.60 
Magnetic Resonance Technology 258,977 0.29 
Respiratory Services 258,977 13.35 
Caesarean Section 258,977 32.69 
Note. The sample excludes those with missing values.  
3.3.2 Pre-trends 
 The key assumption underlying the difference-in-difference method is that the 
outcomes of the treatment and control group would have followed the same trend had 
GBR never been implemented. Although this assumption cannot be tested directly, I 
followed the literature where I first examined the parallel trend visually and then 




the specification following the main model (without the state-specific linear trend) where 
I replaced the previous interaction term with an interaction term of an indicator of 
Maryland and a linear time trend, sub-setting to the pre-period.  
 Figure 3.1 plots the unadjusted means of LOS, cost, and rate of service utilization 
in Maryland and the comparison states, respectively. We can see from Figure 3.1 that 
trends in LOS and mean cost of birth are quite similar in Maryland and the comparison 
states. The log transfer of cost has slightly different trends. 
Figure 3.1: Unadjusted Trends of Cost and LOS for All Infants: Maryland versus 
Comparison States 
 





Figure 3.2 depicts the mean LOS in Maryland and the comparison states by 
gestational age. The trends look similar in all three gestational age groups, except for an 
outlier in the year 2013 among very-preterm infants. The trends look unchanged after 
GBR among preterm and term infants, while increased faster in the comparison states 
than Maryland among the very-preterm infant group.  
Figure 3.2: Unadjusted Trends of LOS for Infants by Gestational Age: Maryland versus 
Comparison States 
 
Note. Comparison states include New York, New Jersey, and Kentucky. 
 
 Figure 3.3 depicts the mean costs of births in Maryland and the comparison states 




cost of birth seems unchanged after GBR for all Maryland infants, while it increased 
faster in the comparison states. 
Figure 3.3: Unadjusted Trends of Cost for Infants by Gestational Age: Maryland versus 
Comparison States 
 
Note. Comparison states include New York, New Jersey, and Kentucky. 
 
Figure 3.4 depicts the unadjusted trends of the utilization rate of each service in 
Maryland and the comparison states among all births. While visual inspections suggested 
that prior trends are mostly similar in Maryland and the comparison states, the parallel 
trends assumption may be violated among some cases, such as the C-section rate (Figure 













Note. Comparison states include New York, New Jersey, and Kentucky. 
 
Table 3.3 presents the results of the pre-implementation trends test for all 
outcomes and subgroups. The tests for services utilization are mostly passed, except for 
respiratory services. Unfortunately, there are violations among overall group LOS and 
cost. The parallel trends assumption is also violated among infants with gestational age 
>=37 weeks, which consists of the majority of all births. Therefore, I reported results 
from the models with state-specific linear trends for those groups who violated the 







Table 3.3: Differential Pre-Trends Test of Infants, 2011-2014  
Outcomes Coef. 95% CIs P-value 
Length of Stay, Days     
 Overall 0.07 (0.05,0.08) 0.001 
Infant Gestation 
   <=32 weeks 0.06 (-1.42,1.54) 0.9 
33-36 weeks 0.06 (-0.19,0.31) 0.5 
>=37 weeks 0.03 (0.01,0.05) 0.015 
Log (Cost) 
   Overall -0.09 (-0.14,-0.03) 0.013 
Infant Gestation 
   <=32 weeks -0.06 (-0.13,0.01) 0.076 
33-36 weeks -0.09 (-0.18,-0.01) 0.038 
>=37 weeks -0.09 (-0.14,-0.04) 0.01 
Indicators of Services Use, %     
 NICU Care -0.1 (-0.56,0.36) 0.526 
Special Care  0.18 (-0.26,0.61) 0.285 
Radiology Diagnostic -0.14 (-0.33,0.06) 0.115 
CT Scan -0.01 (-0.03,0.01) 0.169 
Other Imaging Services -0.26 (-0.53,0.00) 0.052 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging 0.01 (-0.00,0.02) 0.155 
Respiratory Services 2.36 (1.30,3.42) 0.006 
Caesarean Section 0.19 (-0.02, 0.40) 0.064 
Note. Standard errors in the parentheses are clustered at the state level. Models 
control for birthweight, gestational age, sex, race, insurance type, relative 
household income, an indicator of congenital anomalies, an indicator of 
respiratory distress syndrome, urban/rural; state-level poverty rate, unemployment 
rate, birth rate, NICU beds per 1,000 population, and state and year fixed effects.  
3.3.3 Effect of GBR on LOS 
 I begin by considering the effect of GBR on birth-related length of stay. 
Regression estimates of OLS and Poisson models for all infants are displayed in Table 
3.4. Marginal effects are reported for Poisson regressions. For those with violations of 
parallel trend assumption, I present the results with and without state-specific linear 




Table 3.4: Effect of GBR on Length of Stay, 2011-2016 
















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Without State-Specific Linear Trend                
DID Point Estimates -0.01 -1.38 -0.07 -0.01 -0.03 -1.22* -0.04 -0.01 
 
(0.03) (0.51) (0.08) (0.01) (0.03) (0.54) (0.08) (0.01) 
Ferman-Pinto P-value 0.89 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001         
                  
         
With State-Specific Linear Trend                




(0.02) (0.05)     (0.02) 
Ferman-Pinto P-value <0.001     <0.001         
                  
Baseline Mean in Maryland 3.71 36.74 7.27 2.65 3.71 36.74 7.27 2.65 
N 2,538,585 48,228 154,961 2,335,396 2,538,585 48,228 154,961 2,335,396 
Note. Standard errors are in the parentheses, clustered at the state level. Models control for birthweight, gestational age, sex,  race, 
insurance type, relative household income, an indicator of congenital anomalies, an indicator of respiratory distress syndrome, 
urban/rural; state-level poverty rate, unemployment rate, birth rate, NICU beds per 1,000 population, and state and year fixed effects. 






During the two full years’ implementation of GBR, I find that average LOS 
decreased by 0.1 days (bootstrap p-value<0.001) using the OLS model which 
corresponds up to a 2.7 percent decrease in Maryland relative to the comparison states, 
adjusting for the state-specific linear trends. But I do not find a similar decrease using the 
Poisson model. Among infants with gestational age <=32 weeks, the decreases are 
consistent in both OLS and Poisson models by 1.38 (bootstrap p-value<0.001) or 1.22 
days that correspond to a 3.8 or 3.3 percent decrease in Maryland compared to 
comparison states after GBR. Among infants with gestational age between 33 and 36 
weeks, there is a small 0.07 days decrease (bootstrap p-value<0.001). The average LOS 
decreased by 0.06 days which corresponds to a 2.3 percent decrease in Maryland 
compared to the comparison states after GBR.  
3.3.4 Effect of GBR on Cost of Birth 
 Next, I study the effect of GBR on costs of birth for infants. Marginal effects are 
reported for GLM regressions. Log transformation is used for the outcomes in OLS 
regressions.  
 Regression estimates of OLS and GLM models for all infants are displayed in 
Table 3.5. I begin by describing the results from models that do not include state-specific 
linear trends. My results OLS suggests a 4.0% (i.e. exp(-0.04)=0.96) decrease in the cost 
of birth in Maryland compared to that in the comparison states after the implementation 
of GBR. The GLM results suggest a 4.7% decreases. The OLS and GLM models suggest 
similar treatment effect magnitudes as the decline is larger among very-preterm infants 




Table 3.5: Effect of GBR on Total Cost of Birth, 2011-2016 
  OLS GLM 












(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Without State-Specific Linear Trend                
DID Point Estimates -0.04 -0.06 -0.03 -0.04 -180.55* -4403.08* -408.37* -92.31* 
  (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (86.58) (1901.57) (203.95) (41.83) 
Ferman-Pinto P-Value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001         
                  
                  
With State-Specific Linear Trend                
DID Point Estimates 0.14** NA 0.15* 0.14*** 684.48*** NA 1691.53*** 334.10*** 
  (0.01)  (0.04) (0.01) (74.74)  (491.32) (25.08) 
Ferman-Pinto P-Value <0.001  <0.001 <0.001        
                  
Baseline Mean in Maryland 3,811.35 61,222.01 8,865.43 2,051.48 3,811.35 61,222.01 8,865.43 2,051.48 
N 2,538,585 48,228 154,961 2,335,396 2,538,585 48,228 154,961 2,335,396 
Note. Standard errors are in the parentheses, clustered at state-level. Models control for birthweight, gestational age, sex, race, insurance type, 
relative household income, an indicator of congenital anomalies, an indicator of respiratory distress syndrome, urban/rural; state-level poverty rate, 
unemployment rate, birth rate, NICU beds per 1,000 population, and state and year fixed effects. Marginal effects are reported for GLM models. N 





The inclusion of state-specific trends leads to results with the opposite sign. The OLS 
outcome suggests a 15.0% (i.e. exp(0.14)=1.15) increase in costs of birth, and similar results are 
obtained by GLM (17.9%).  Differences between the model with and without linear trends can 
cast doubt on the validity of the study design. While such differences are concerning, they are 
consistent with Roberts et al., who studied the effects of GBR on hospital and primary care use 
and found that the sign of the treatment effect differed when including or excluding linear trends. 
Much like Roberts et al., the validity of either model depends on which unobserved assumption 
is actually at play. Given these differences, I cannot come to firm conclusions about the causal 
effects of GBR on hospital-based costs for infants.  
3.3.5 Effect of GBR on Service Utilization 
 In Table 3.6, I study the effect of GBR on service utilization patterns. Given that the 
outcomes in columns 1-6 and 8 passed the pre-trend tests at the 5% significance level, I used a 
model without state-specific linear trends for these outcomes. I find a 0.6 percentage points 
decrease in NICU care, which corresponds to a 7.8 percent decrease after GBR in Maryland 
compared to the comparison states. There’s a 0.76 percentage points (i.e., 11.2%) decrease in 
special care, which is a lower level neonatal care compared to NICU that provides respiratory 
services and mainly serves infants with relatively lower sickness. In addition, utilization for CT 
scans decreased significantly by 20.0%. The respiratory services use are not consistently 
estimated using models with or without state-specific linear trends since there’s a 24.4% decline 






















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Without State-Specific Linear Trend            
 DID Point Estimates -0.60* -0.76** -0.04 -0.03* -0.15 -0.03 1.88* 0.1 
 
(0.14) (0.10) (0.14) (0.01) (0.20) (0.02) (0.39) (0.14) 
Ferman-Pinto P-Value 0.02 0.02 0.80 <0.001 0.65 0.45 <0.001 0.49 
                
          
With State-Specific Linear Trend            
 DID Point Estimates NA NA NA NA NA NA -2.86** NA 
 
        
 
  (0.41) 
 Ferman-Pinto P-Value             <0.001   
Baseline Mean in 
Maryland 7.66 6.81 6.79 0.15 5.60 0.29 13.35 32.69 
Note. N=2,538,585. Standard errors are in the parentheses, clustered at the state-level. Models control for birthweight, gestational age, 
sex, race, insurance type, relative household income, an indicator of congenital anomalies, an indicator of respiratory distress syndrome, 
urban/rural; state-level poverty rate, unemployment rate, birth rate, NICU beds per 1,000 population, and state and year fixed effects. N 




3.3.6 Cost Estimation by Hospital Department 
The analyses of service utilization and cost in further detail are always favorable. 
Although the examination of all types of services might not be feasible in one paper, I 
show in Table 3.7 that the majority (73.7%) of inpatient costs of births in Maryland come 
from the nursery department. My analyses on the NICU and special unit care, therefore, 
captured the big picture of neonatal hospital care. Given different hospital payment 
settings, the distributions of services use and the cost by the department are different in 
Maryland, compared to the comparison states (Table 3.7), which impede my ability to 
conduct a DID analysis for each department separately. I show some descriptive results in 
this section instead, to help better understand the distributions and patterns of the birth-
related service use and cost at the aggregate level, by comparing Maryland and the other 
comparison states.  
Table 3.7: Aggregate Inpatient Hospitalization Costs Attributable to Each 
Department, 2011-2016 
Department, % Maryland Comparison State 
Clinic 0.00 0.05 
Special Care Units 1.09 0.54 
Routine Bed Units 1.18 0.37 
Nursery 73.70 84.84 
All Other Ancillary 0.56 0.58 
Operating Room 0.77 0.93 
Therapies 6.23 2.35 
Pharmacy 5.58 3.34 
Laboratory 10.89 7.02 
                 Note. Comparison states include New York, New Jersey, and Kentucky 
 Figure 3.5 presents the prevalence of service utilization for infants by each 




prevalence is around 100%), while very few of them use special care units (i.e., the 
prevalence is below 10%). We can see that in Maryland, the prevalence of therapy 
services increases substantially before GBR, while it started to decrease after GBR. 
Service utilization in other departments is relatively stable over time. In the comparison 
states, there is a rapid increase in pharmacy department use and a slow increase in 
services within the therapies department. The distributions across the department are also 
different between Maryland and the comparison states where Maryland has a higher 
prevalence of billing into the therapies department. 
Furthermore, I examined the distribution of the average cost of birth attribute to 
each department (Figure 3.6). The main cost comes from the department of nursery both 
in Maryland and the comparison states, which is also suggested in Table 3.7. The average 
costs attributed to the nursery department has a descending pattern in Maryland before 
GBR and starts to increase after GBR, while the nursery cost in other comparison states 
















































































Figure 3.6: Distribution of Total Cost of Birth by Department for Infants, 2011-2016 
 
 
3.3.7 Sensitivity Analyses 
The results of the sensitivity analyses supported my main findings (Appendix B). 
The effects of GBR using 2014 as the implementation year are larger compared to using 
the year of 2015. Specifically, I find that GBR in Maryland led to a 7% decline in 






















































weeks) infants who used to have longer stays compared to term (>=37 weeks) infants. In 
addition, I find significant declines in the use of NICU care, special care, CT scan, MRI, 
and respiratory services. The results using birthweight also came to a similar conclusion 
using gestational age.  
3.4 Discussion 
 In this paper, I study the hospitals’ responses to a statewide global budget 
program in Maryland by focusing on birth-related services. I find that the GBR program 
in Maryland led to a 2.7% decline in average LOS for infants, which are mainly driven by 
the decrease among very-preterm (<32 weeks) infants who used to have longer stays 
compared to other infants. In addition, I find significant declines in the use of NICU care 
(7.8%), special unit care (11.2%), and CT scan (20.0%). Assuming parallel trends, I find 
a significant decrease in costs of birth by 4% among all births and by 6% among very-
preterm births; but assuming differential trends, I find a 14% increase in the total cost of 
birth for the overall sample. 
 Under GBR, all the acute-care hospitals in Maryland were assigned an annual 
revenue cap since 2014. Hospitals faced the risk of a reduced budget in the next year if its 
expenditures are not aligned with the budget in the current year starting July 2015, 
regardless of underage or overage. This program creates meaningful incentives for 
hospitals to manage their utilization, price, and expenditure. In particular, hospitals now 
have the incentive to reduce intensive margins where they can maintain the same revenue 
by raising the unit price, which in turn may rise the operating margins (Giuriceo et al. 
2016). This is supported by my findings, where I find a significant decrease in LOS and 





 I find that GBR was associated with a decline in total LOS and utilization of a 
series of neonatal services for newborns, while no consistently significant change in the 
cost of birth. These findings are a supplement to current findings of GBR on hospital 
utilization and expenditure, providing encouraging evidence on the effectiveness of a 
global hospital budget model on reducing unnecessary volumes, and also shed light on an 






















The neonatal intensive care unit (NICU), defined by CDC’s birth registration 
program as a facility that is “staffed and equipped to provide continuous mechanical 
ventilatory support”, provides highly specialized care to newborns (Martin and Menacker 
2004). NICU care is highly valuable and has been linked to substantial reductions in 
infant mortality for infants that need it, typically infants who are born preterm or very 
low birthweight. Along with the development of NICUs, the infant mortality rate in the 
US has declined from 26 per 1,000 live births in the 1960s to 5.9 per 1,000 live births in 
2016.  
NICUs are also costly and highly profitable facilities, serving as one of the major 
profit centers for hospitals. A NICU-stay costs approximately $56,000 for commercial 
members and $39,000 among Medicaid beneficiaries (David C. Goodman, George A. 
Little, Wade N. Harrison, Atle Moen, Meredith E. Mowitz, Cecilia Ganduglia-Cazaban, 
Kristen K. Bronner 2019). A 2010 Health Affairs article that profiled one academic 
medical center’s efforts found that NICU admissions made up just for 4% of total 
hospital admissions but accounted for 69% of net profits (Lantos 2010). Not surprisingly, 
the marriage of high effectiveness and high profitability led to the rapid growth of the 




Goodman 2015). Hence, there are compelling reasons for researchers to investigate the 
financial incentives related to NICU care and the consequences of its fast expansion.  
There are at least three strands of evidence that suggest that admissions among 
relatively low-risk (those with higher birthweight) infants are particularly sensitive to 
financial incentives. The first is the variation of the NICU admission rate across 
geography and hospitals, controlling for infant’s birthweight (a key measurement of 
infant risk). For example, a report of the Dartmouth Atlas Project found that there was no 
regional variation of NICU admission among very-low birthweight infants (<1500g), 
while it varied 3 times for moderately-low birthweight infants (1500-2499g) and up to 5 
times among those normal birthweight infants. Second, the composition of NICU 
admitted infants has changed over time. Specifically, from 2007 to 2017, among admitted 
infants, the percent of very-low birthweight infants decreased from 16.1% to 12.7%, 
while the percent of normal birthweight infants increased from 42.2% to 48.0%. Third, 
NICU admissions were found to be correlated with the unit census and bed supply; and 
these correlations were concentrated among infants who do not possess clear clinical 
indicators of need (W. N. Harrison, Wasserman, and Goodman 2018; Freedman 2016a; J. 
Schulman et al. 2018). For example, Freedman (2016) exploits exogenous capacity 
variation documenting a causal impact of empty beds on NICU admission among infants 
with higher birthweight (Freedman 2016a). 
Insurance plays an important role in reimbursement and hospital financing and is 
a key lever in hospital financial incentives. Previous studies suggest that more neonatal 
services are used among newborns covered by private insurance, compared with 




private payers have higher unit prices, this pattern is consistent with hospitals over-
supplying NICU services to private pay patients, relative to patient need, or 
undersupplying it to publically funded patients. Medicaid expansion has also been shown 
to affect hospitals’ decisions to adopt the NICU, which was attributed to the increase in 
the relative price of Medicaid compared to private (Freedman, Lin, and Simon 2015). 
 While these studies exploit sound identification strategies, the data used in these 
studies are from decades ago such that conclusions from these studies may not reflect the 
recent rapid change of NICU care. Little is known about the variation in NICU care 
across the type of payers in the contemporary setting.  
This descriptive study uses birth certificate data to explore the variation of NICU 
use across insurance payers and to examine how much such variation could be explained 
by infant risk factors, maternal characteristics, and state characteristics.  
4.2 Background 
4.2.1 The Development of NICU 
The infant mortality rate (death within the first year of life) in the United States 
has declined from 26.0 per 1,000 live births on average in the 1960s to 9.2 in the 1990s to 
5.9 in 2016 (Xu et al. 2018). The decline that happened during the 1960s to the 1990s 
was mainly driven by the drop in neonatal infant mortality (under 28 days from birth) 
among preterm infants (Cutler and Meara 2000). From 1950 to 1990, mortality rates of 
very low birthweight infants (VLBW) (<1500g) declined by 42 percent, and mortality 




(Cutler and McClellan 2001)
2
. These reductions of mortality were accomplished through 
the diffusion of technologies related to birth and the corresponding development of 
NICUs (Cutler and McClellan 2001).  
In the first half of the 20th century, the incubator was the only "high tech" 
treatment for preterm infants (Jorgensen 2012). With the development of the ventilator 
for infants, the first modern NICU opened in the 1960s, with ancillary facilities to 
maintain temperature and nutrition and obstetric monitoring facilities. In the 1970s, the 
major innovation of ventilators happened, and the American Board of Pediatrics 
developed a Sub-Board on Neonatal-Perinatal Medicine (NPM) to further strengthen the 
specialty of neonatal care. In the 1980s-1990s, major innovations, such as antenatal 
corticosteroid treatment, tocolytics, high-speed, high-frequency ventilation, and the use 
of surfactant (approved by FDA which was believed to significantly help the prevention 
of respiratory distress syndrome (RDS) in premature infants with high risks of RDS),  
were adopted in neonatal intensive care (Cutler and Meara 2000).  
In 2004, the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) designated 3 levels of 
neonatal care (American Academy of Pediatrics 2004). Level I provided basic care which 
is required of all inpatient maternity facilities, Level II provided specialty care for 
moderately ill newborns, and Level III provided subspecialty care for severely ill 
newborns with three subdivisions based on degrees of complexity and risk. However, 
there was great heterogeneity in applying this classification, and as a result, some VLBW 
infants were not sent to level III hospitals as expected. The classification lacked detailed 
                                                 
2
 The average birthweight among singleton term birth decreases from 1990-2005 (Donahue et al. 2010), 





and standardized instructions, and until 2009, only 5 states had at least 90% of VLBW 
infants delivered to high-risk (level III) facilities (American Academy of Pediatrics 2012). 
 As a result, in 2009, the AAP updated the levels of neonatal care into 4 levels 
that consist of basic care (level I), specialty care (level II), and subspecialty intensive care 
(level III and level IV) with detailed information on functional criteria (e.g., birthweight 
and gestational age), capabilities (i.e., physical space, equipment, technology, and 
organization) and provider types (American Academy of Pediatrics 2012). Specifically, 
level I facilities, i.e., well newborn nurseries, provide the basic level of care to infants 
who are at low risk. They can also care for preterm infants at 35 to 37 weeks of gestation 
with certain conditions and late preterm infants at 34 to 36 weeks of gestation with 
further consideration. Level II facilities, i.e., special care nurseries, provide care for 
infants >=32 weeks and >=1500g while they are stable or moderately ill with conditions, 
provide mechanical ventilation for less than 24 hours duration and/or continuous positive 
airway pressure, and provide care for those after intensive care. Level III, i.e., NICU, 
with extra capabilities based on level II, provide care for infants of <32 weeks' gestation 
and weighing <1500g or with a critical illness. The designation of this level of care 
should be based on the clinical experience of certain specialists with expertise in 
neonatology. Level III NICUs are required to equip continuously available personnel 
(neonatologists, neonatal nurses, respiratory therapists) and equipment to provide 
sustained life support. It provides a full range of respiratory support, including 
conventional and/or high-frequency ventilation and inhaled nitric oxide.  In addition, 
these units are required to have the capability to perform major surgery and advanced 




capabilities based on level III, provide care to the most complex and critically ill 
newborns as a regional center. These units are usually located within an institution, with 
additional capabilities to perform surgical repair of the complex condition and to equip a 
full range of pediatric subspecialists on-site, have easy transportation, and provide 
outreach education to keep pace with the latest knowledge.  
4.2.2 The Current Status of NICU 
Given the economic benefit of hospital constructing a NICU (regardless of size 
and capacity), a "deregionalization" trend to NICU occurred in the 1980s to 1990s, which 
expanded NICUs from originally large, regional hospital setting to smaller, community 
hospitals offering less sophisticated care (Schwartz, Kellogg, and Muri 2000; S A Lorch, 
Maheshwari, and Even-Shoshan 2012). While the number of births increased only by 
17.6% from 1980 to 1995, the number of hospitals with a NICU increased by 98.9% and 
the number of NICU beds increased by 137.9% (Howell et al. 2002). In addition, 89% of 
new NICUs opened at that time were low-level NICUs, contrasted to 46% before 1980 
(Baker and Phibbs 2002). There were also some geographic variations on NICU adoption. 
A perinatal survey in 2008 from AAP revealed that numbers of NICUs across states vary 
from 0 to 33, and numbers of NICU beds vary from 76 to 754 (S A Lorch, Maheshwari, 
and Even-Shoshan 2012). As of 2009, 37 states and District of Columbia with a 
certificate-of-need program (which sought to reduce expansions to healthcare 
infrastructure) had fewer hospitals with NICUs and fewer NICU beds in the hospitals (S 
A Lorch, Maheshwari, and Even-Shoshan 2012).  
In 2012, 8.5 percent of newborns were admitted to a NICU.  The units were 




births, compared with 43 per 1,000 of normal-birth-weight infants (2500g-4000g) (W. 
Harrison and Goodman 2015).  Admission rates to NICUs increased from 64 to 77.9 per 
1,000 live births during the six-year study period from 2007 to 2012 across the US (W. 
Harrison and Goodman 2015).  
The increase of newborns admitted into NICUs could be solely due to medical 
reasons. For example, advancements in obstetric care might result in lowering the 
gestational age of viability. Thus, we might expect to see an increase in NICU services 
simply because there are more infants born alive that might benefit from NICU care. 
However, Harrison and Goodman (2015) showed that newborns who were admitted into 
a NICU were larger and less premature from year to year (W. Harrison and Goodman 
2015), suggesting that the increasing admissions cannot be explained by an increase in 
the number of live but sick births. Schulman et al. (2018) found a 34-fold variation exists 
in admission rates across 130 NICUs in California, which cannot be fully explained by 
illness acuity. The NICU admission rate was negatively correlated with the percentage of 
admissions with a high degree of illness (J. Schulman et al. 2018). 
About 4 million babies are born in the United States each year (CDC 2016a). As 
of 2011, births accounted for 10 percent of all inpatient discharges (Kowlessar, Jiang, and 
Steiner 2013). In 2009, the total cost of birth hospitalization and re-hospitalization was 
over $13 billion  (Barradas et al. 2016). The 9.1% of all births who are preterm and/or 
low birth weight accounted for 43.4% of the total cost (Barradas et al. 2016). Compared 
with a normal birth that costs up to $3,200 for three-day stays, preterm newborns 
(gestational age<37 weeks) cost $21,500 and the average length of stay is 14.3 days; 




average $14,000 and $76,700 respectively, and the average length of stay is 10.9 and 42.6 
days, respectively. Newborns who have complications such as respiratory distress 
syndrome might cost $54,900, and the length of stays extend to 31.3 days (Kowlessar, 
Jiang, and Steiner 2013). The cost can reach a maximum of nearly $546,000 for very sick 
infants using the 2001 National Inpatient Sample from HCUP (Russell et al. 2007). Even 
though the prevalence of certain complications and conditions can be very rare, the 
chances of having a preterm and low birth weight baby are 8.5 percent and 6.1 percent, 
respectively (Kowlessar, Jiang, and Steiner 2013).  
Costs for birth have grown from year to year. The cost per low birthweight 
(<2500g) infant was $6,850 in the 1970s and increased to $11,048 in 1988 (both 
measured in 1990 dollars) (Cutler and Meara 2000). There are also subsequent costs for 
caring for low birthweight babies with disabilities and other developmental difficulties. 
Cutler et al. (2000) estimated that the total spending for children with health problems, 
including costs of medical, benefit payments, and special education, was $4,136 in 1960 
and $8,271 in 1990, as measured in 1990 dollars (Cutler and Meara 2000). And Kuo et al. 
(2018) found that most post-NICU spending occurred within the first year after discharge 
which is $33,276 per person per year using newborn data from 2010 (Kuo et al. 2018).  
4.3 Methods 
4.3.1 Data  
Data from the 2016-2017 restricted-use natality files of the Vital Statistics (VS) 
was used (CDC 2003). The natality files have information on nearly all births in the US. 




Birth, collecting mothers’ and infants’ information on demographic characteristics, 
medical and public program utilization, and health characteristics. (CDC 2003). NICU 
admission status was first available in seven states in 2004 using the 2003 revised version 
of US Birth Certificates. The adoption of this new version of the birth certificate 
expanded to all states, the District of Columbia, and territories as of January 1, 2016 
(CDC 2016b). Given that NICU admission status was first available in 2016 for all states 
and 2017 was the latest year at the time of data application for this dissertation, only two 
years of data were used in this analysis. The birth file was merged with state-by-year 
characteristics, obtained from State Health Compare, Area Health Resources Files, Kaiser 
Family Foundation, and CDC Wonder (State Health Compare 2019; HRSA 2019; KFF 2017; 
CDC 2018). 
 The sample included all newborns in all 50 states and DC. Births in territories or 
with missing values in any covariates were excluded. Infants weighing less than 500g 
were also excluded from the final sample, given they were usually not considered as live 
births (W. N. Harrison, Wasserman, and Goodman 2018; W. Harrison and Goodman 
2015).  
 I observed 7,809,667 births during the years 2016 and 2017 in 50 states and DC. 
Observations that were missing in any covariates were dropped, accounting for 3.36% 
(262,347) of total births. The final sample was 7,547,320 births. 
4.3.2 Study Variables 
The outcome variable was an indicator of NICU admission status. NICU 
admission in the Birth Files is defined as “admission into a facility or unit staffed and 




The key independent variable was the principal source of payment for this 
delivery that was categorized into Medicaid, private insurance, self-pay, and other 
sources (including Indian Health Services, CHAMPUS/TRICARE, other government, 
and any other sources). The covariates of infant’s characteristics included: birthweight, 
gestational age, gender, 5 min Apgar score, plurality, an indicator of small for gestational 
age (SGA), and an indicator of any congenital anomaly; maternal characteristics included 
race, age, education, parity, and indicators of maternal pregnancy risks, infections, and 
morbidity; state characteristics included poverty rate, unemployment rate, birth rate, 
NICU bed per 1,000 population, and prescription rates of Oxycodone and Hydrocodone. 
The birthweight was categorized into following groups: very-low birthweight (500g-
1,499g), moderately-low birthweight (1,500g-2,499g), and normal birthweight 
(>=2,500g). These categories were widely used in the pediatric literature and guideline 
which facilitates the comparison to previous studies (Kilpatrick, Papile, and Macones 
2017; David C. Goodman, George A. Little, Wade N. Harrison, Atle Moen, Meredith E. 
Mowitz, Cecilia Ganduglia-Cazaban, Kristen K. Bronner 2019). Based on AAP’s 
perinatal care guidelines, all infants who weighing less than 1,500g should be sent into 
NICUs while admissions of all other infants depend on infant’s health condition and were 
decided by physicians. Infants weighing more than 2,500g were commonly considered as 
normal births and faced lower risks. 
4.3.3 Statistical Analysis 
Using single and multivariable linear probability models, I examined whether 
NICU admission rate is associated with insurance type with and without adjusting for 




characteristics by each step: first adding state and year fixed effects, then adding infant 
risk factors, and finally adding maternal and state characteristics. The most saturated 
model takes the form: 
  𝑁𝐼𝐶𝑈𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡 
+𝑿𝒊𝒔𝒕Γ + 𝒁𝒔𝒕ρ + 𝒖𝒔 + 𝜸𝒕 + 𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑡 
where 𝑿𝒊𝒔𝒕 was a vector of infant and maternal covariates, 𝒁𝒔𝒕 was a vector of 
state characteristics,  𝒖𝒔 was a vector of state fixed effects, 𝜸𝒕 was a vector of year fixed 
effects, and 𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑡  is a random error term. I then performed subgroup analyses by 
birthweight. All standard errors are clustered at the state level to allow for unobserved 
determinants of NICU admission to be correlated within states but independent across 
states.  
There might be some state-level factors that were correlated with maternal 
insurance type, such as the affordability and accessibility of the private insurance market, 
the complexity of enrollment process of Medicaid, or the take-up rate of Medicaid 
patients by physicians, etc. To reduce potential omitted variable bias, I added state fixed 
effects into models to control for both observed and unobserved the time-invariant state 
characteristics. Year fixed effects were also included to control for temporal variation 
over time that is constant across all states. Analyses were conducted using Stata version 15 






4.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 4.1 displays the descriptive statistics of the study population, demonstrating 
infant, maternal, and state characteristics by insurance types where 42.66% of births in 
the years 2016-2017 were covered by Medicaid, 49.29% were covered by private 
insurance, 4.18% were uninsured, and 3.87% were paid by other sources. I focus on the 
Medicaid and privately insured population since they accounted for more than 90% of all 
births in the US. The distributions of maternal characteristics differ greatly between 
Medicaid and privately insured population. I observe a much higher proportion of non-
Hispanic Black and Hispanic, younger, less educated, with higher parity, and a higher 
prevalence of infections during pregnancy among Medicaid mothers. The infants covered 
by Medicaid were more likely to be low birthweight, have a shorter gestational age, and 
have a lower Apgar score, compared to privately insured infants. The Medicaid infants 
are also more likely to be small for gestational age, which may partly attribute to the 
racial differences in the prevalence of SGA, which is higher for African-Americans 
infants compare to Whites (Alexander et al. 1999). The state characteristics are very 
similar across insurance types.  
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics by Insurance Type 
Characteristic, % Overall Medicaid 
Private 
Insurance Self-pay Others 
Mother's Characteristics 
     Race 
     Non-Hispanic White 52.4 37.25 67.39 35.76 46.45 
Non-Hispanic Black 14.36 22.12 8.08 10.74 12.71 
Non-Hispanic Other 9.64 7.74 10.97 12.05 11.21 
Hispanic 23.59 32.89 13.56 41.45 29.63 
Age 




20-24 20.16 30.03 11.46 17.72 24.85 
25-34 57.44 49.39 64.49 57.58 56.21 
35-44 16.94 11 22.09 19.78 13.63 
45+ 0.22 0.12 0.31 0.29 0.17 
Education  
     Less than High School 13.5 23.96 2.78 31.59 15.2 
High School 25.29 38.71 13.94 22.05 25.47 
Some College 28.92 29.77 28.64 18.27 34.55 
University and Above 32.29 7.56 54.65 28.08 24.78 
Parity 
     First 38.09 33.02 42.93 32.28 38.55 
Second 32.21 29.52 34.9 28.99 31 
Third or Higher 29.71 37.46 22.17 38.73 30.46 
Indicator of Any Maternal 
Morbidity  1.19 1.01 1.33 1.08 1.5 
Indicator of Any Risk 
Factors during Pregnancy   29.68 30.01 30.08 23.31 27.86 
Indicator of Any Infections 
during Pregnancy 2.67 4.59 1.05 2.28 2.44 
Infant's Characteristics 
     Birthweight 
     500-1499g 1.21 1.43 1.04 1.02 1.2 
1500-2499g 6.76 7.91 5.89 5.58 6.36 
>=2500g 92.03 90.66 93.07 93.4 92.44 
Gestational Age  
      <32 weeks 1.38 1.61 1.19 1.21 1.39 
32-36 weeks 8.23 9 7.69 6.78 8.09 
>=37 weeks  90.4 89.39 91.13 92.01 90.52 
5 Min Apgar Score 
     0-3 0.45 0.53 0.38 0.46 0.5 
4-6 1.38 1.51 1.27 1.28 1.53 
7-8 12.08 12.37 11.78 11.21 13.55 
9-10 86.09 85.59 86.57 87.06 84.42 
Plurality 
     Single  96.62 97.1 96.12 97.47 96.88 
Twin 3.28 2.83 3.75 2.44 3.03 
Triplet or More 0.1 0.06 0.13 0.09 0.09 
Male 51.15 51.05 51.18 51.55 51.33 
Indicator of Any 
Congenital Anomaly 0.34 0.36 0.33 0.35 0.32 
Indicator of Small for 
Gestational Age 8.66 10.32 7.26 8.81 8.16 
State Characteristics 




Poverty Rate 11.28 11.59 11.00 11.41 11.30 
Unemployment Rate 5.23 5.30 5.17 5.18 5.22 
Birth Rate 12.13 12.15 12.07 12.35 12.45 
NICU Bed, per 1,000 pop 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
Prescription of Oxycodone, 
kilograms per 100,000 pop 16.47 16.48 16.54 16.05 15.96 
Prescription of 
Hydrocodone, kilograms 
per 100,000 pop 9.41 9.79 9.09 9.34 9.42 
N 7,547,320 3,219,485 3,719,746 315,814 
292,27
5 
Note. Data from the Vital Statistics 2016-2017. The sample includes 50 states and 
DC, infants with birthweight higher than 500g, and with no missing values in all 
covariates. 
 
 Table 4.2 presents the descriptive summary of outcome variables by insurance 
type, and for each birthweight subgroup. Among all births, I observe an 8.7% NICU 
admission rate. The utilization of all these services is much higher among infants with 
very-low birthweight, lower for moderately-low infants, and much lower among normal 
birth infants. Comparing across insurance types, the overall NICU admission rate was 
highest among Medicaid infants. However, for all very-low birthweight infants, the 
NICU was used the most among privately insured infants. This difference also applied to 
moderately-low birthweight infants. For normal birthweight infants, the NICU admission 










Table 4.2: NICU Admission Rates by Insurance Type and by Birthweight 
NICU Admission, % Overall 
Birthweigh








Overall 8.7 87.85 43.49 5.11 
By Insurance Type 
    Medicaid 9.51 87.48 41.58 5.49 
Private Insurance 8.19 88.72 45.9 4.9 
Self-pay 6.91 84.08 41.87 3.98 
Other 8.25 86.4 42.75 4.86 
Note. Data from the Vital Statistics 2016-2017. The sample includes 50 states 
and DC, infants with birthweight higher than 500g, and with no missing 
values in all covariates. 
 
4.4.2 Variation in NICU Admissions across Insurance Type 
 Table 4.3 presents the association of insurance type with the likelihood of 
admission into a NICU. In the unadjusted model, private NICU admissions were 1.32 
percentage points lower than Medicaid. After adjusting for infant characteristics only, the 
association decreased to 0.34 percentage points difference. In the final model that adjusts 
for infant, maternal, state characteristics, and fixed effects, I observe a 0.61 percentage 











Table 4.3: The Association between Insurance Type and NICU Admissions 
 
Unadjusted Adjusted Adjusted Adjusted 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
Medicaid Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
     
Private Insurance -1.32*** -1.39*** -0.34*** -0.61*** 
 
(0.16) (0.16) (0.09) (0.07) 
  
 Infant Characteristics N N Y Y 
Maternal Characteristics N N N Y 
State Characteristics N N N Y 
State Fixed Effects N Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects N Y Y Y 
Note. N=7,547,320. Percentage points are reported. Standard errors are in the 
parentheses, clustered at the state level. Infant characteristics include birthweight, 
gestational age, sex, an indicator of congenital anomalies, Apgar score, an indicator of 
small for gestational age, and plurality; maternal characteristics included race, age, 
education, parity, and indicators of maternal pregnancy risks, infections, and morbidity; 
state characteristics included level poverty rate, unemployment rate, birth rate, NICU 
beds per 1,000 population, and prescription rates of Oxycodone and Hydrocodone. N 
denotes the number of observations.*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
Table 4.4 examined the association of insurance type and NICU admission by 
birthweight categories. It shows that among very-low birthweight infants that need NICU 
care, the unadjusted admission rate is 1.25 percentage points higher for infants covered 
by private insurance. The difference disappears both in magnitude and significance after 
controlling for infant characteristics. Including maternal and state characteristics do not 
change the results much. A similar pattern has been seen among moderately-low 
birthweight infants where the unadjusted NICU admission is 4.32 percentage points 
higher among private insured infants, and the adjusted admission becomes small in 




among normal birthweight infants persists after controlling for all the covariates and 
fixed effects. 
Table 4.4: The Association between Insurance Type and NICU Admissions, by 
Birthweight 
 
Unadjusted Adjusted Adjusted Adjusted 




Private Insurance 1.25*** 1.21*** 0.6 -0.38 
 
(0.35) (0.34) (0.34) (0.41) 




(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Medicaid Ref. 
Private Insurance 4.32*** 3.59*** 0.74* -0.48* 
 
(0.59) (0.47) (0.28) (0.22) 




Private Insurance -0.59*** -0.67*** -0.47*** -0.62*** 
 
(0.11) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) 
N 6,945,843  
Infant Characteristics N N Y Y 
Maternal Characteristics N N N Y 
State Characteristics N N N Y 
State Fixed Effects N Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects N Y Y Y 
Note. Percentage points are reported. Standard errors are in the parentheses, clustered at 
the state level. Infant characteristics include birthweight, gestational age, sex, an indicator 
of congenital anomalies, Apgar score, an indicator of small for gestational age, and 
plurality; maternal characteristics included race, age, education, parity, and indicators of 
maternal pregnancy risks, infections, and morbidity; state characteristics included level 
poverty rate, unemployment rate, birth rate, NICU beds per 1,000 population, and 
prescription rates of Oxycodone and Hydrocodone. N denotes the number of 





Most births are fully or partially covered by health insurance in the US. The two 
main sources of health insurance covering births are Medicaid and private insurance. As 
of 2011, 44.7 percent of all births were covered by Medicaid, and 48.7 percent were 
covered by private insurance, and the remaining 3.6 percent are uninsured, and 3 percent 
have other types of insurance coverage (Kowlessar, Jiang, and Steiner 2013). I find that 
Medicaid covered 42.66% of births and privately insurance covered 49.29% as of 2016-
2017. Newborns’ characteristics also differ between Medicaid and private payers such 
that newborns covered by Medicaid had higher incidence rates for preterm (8.9 percent vs. 
8.1 percent) and low birth weight (6.8 percent and 5.5 percent) (Kowlessar, Jiang, and 
Steiner 2013). In this study, I also find the differences in maternal characteristics between 
Medicaid and privately insured births. For example, I observe a much higher proportion 
of non-Hispanic Black and Hispanic, younger, less educated, with higher parity, and a 
higher prevalence of infections during pregnancy among Medicaid mothers,  
Health insurance is a crucial source of financial incentives where reimbursement 
rates for physicians and hospitals differed across payers. Higher reimbursement may lead 
to more utilization. There is plenty of literature discussing the relationship between health 
insurance and healthcare service utilization for different types of medical services (e.g., 
Anderson, Dobkin, & Gross, 2012; Finkelstein et al., 2012; Jackson, 2018; Meer & 
Rosen, 2004). Unfortunately, neonatal specific research was very limited. Given that 
private insurance usually reimburses medical services more generously compared with 
public insurance, Braveman et al. (1991) found that sick newborns that are either without 




hospital stays compared with privately insured, using data from California (Braveman et 
al. 1991). Moreover, newborns that were covered by Medicaid received less “low-tech” 
neonatal care compared with privately covered newborns using US birth certificate data 
(1987-1992) (Currie and Gruber 2001). A recent descriptive study found no relationship 
between the number of special care days between commercial and Medicaid insured 
among very low birthweight or low-risk infants (David C. Goodman, George A. Little, 
Wade N. Harrison, Atle Moen, Meredith E. Mowitz, Cecilia Ganduglia-Cazaban, Kristen 
K. Bronner 2019).  
This study adds suggestive evidence to previous findings on comparing “high-
tech” NICU service utilization between Medicaid and privately insured. With 
stratification analysis by birthweight, I also show that the difference across payers can be 
explained by infant risk factors for very-low birthweight infants, but cannot be explained 
for lower-risk infants.  
Within the population of normal weight infants, private coverage is associated 
with a reduction in NICU admission. While it’s possible that the higher reimbursement 
rates of private insurance did incentivize more NICU admissions among privately insured 
infants that were relatively healthy, my results suggest that the amount of these effects 
are likely to be quite small. 
4.6 Conclusion 
This study explores the variation in NICU utilization that is related to a critical 
source of financial incentive – insurance coverage. In spite of an existing significant 




variation does not persist after adjusting for infant risk among very-low birthweight 
infants who need intensive service the most. The variations persist for normal birthweight 
infants that were relatively healthy. Although these findings are descriptive, they suggest 
that a great amount of variation is not attributed to demand-side factors given that the 


















Chapter 5 : Conclusion 
 
This dissertation provides the latest evidence of Maryland’s Global Budget 
Revenue program on hospital-based neonatal care and the knowledge of the economic 
incentives related to the NICU service. This work contributes to the literature on three 
aspects. 
First, lessons from the Maryland model are critical to national efforts at reforming 
the health care delivery system. This dissertation expands the evaluation of Maryland’s 
model to a high value but expensive hospital service. I provide evidence on the direct or 
spillover effects of GBR on NICU services which is lacking in the previous evaluation.  
Secondly, previous studies investigating economic incentives on NICU 
utilizations mainly focus on the relationship between capacity and admission. In this 
dissertation, I expand the literature by exploring the incentives generated from 
Maryland’s payment reform. In addition, I provide evidence on more outcomes (i.e. 
admission into lower level neonatal nursery, length of stay, and cost) which are not 
captured by NICU admission rate in previous studies.  
This work also contributes to the literature as it is the first time that NICU 
utilization is compared by insurance type from a population perspective. The findings 
help us to better understand the role that health insurance played in the NICU utilization 








   Appendix A
A1. Coding of Comparison States 
The primary comparison states used in the main analysis consist of states that had 
adopted the 2003 revision of the birth certificate by 2010 and adopted the ACA Medicaid 
expansion. The implementation of the 2003 revision of the U.S. Standard Certificate of 
Live Birth started in 2004. As of January 1, 2016, all states and the District of Columbia 
had implemented this revised certificate. Maryland implemented the revised birth 
certificate on January 1, 2010. I obtained the list of states that had implemented the 2003 
revised birth certificate as of January 1, 2010 to ensure a comparable time series across 
states. Thirty-three states and District of Columbia met this criterion (CDC 2010). I 
didn’t include 2010 in my study period as we considered it as a transition period in which 
hospitals were adapting to the new form.  
I next obtained the ACA Medicaid expansion status from Boudreaux et al. (2019) 
which also provided the timing of the expansion (M. Boudreaux et al. 2019). The 
following table (Table A.1) summarized the coding of Medicaid expansion status. I 
included all states that expanded Medicaid regardless of the timing of expansion in my 
main analyses. The states in bold were used in the preferred specification of comparison 









A2. Variable Definitions 
The individual-level covariates included in the preferred specification were: 
birthweight category (500-1499g, 1500-2499g, 2500-3999g, 4000g+), gestational age 
category (<32 week (very preterm), 32-36 week (moderately preterm), 37-41 (term), 
>41week (postterm)), maternal race and ethnicity (non-Hispanic White, non-Hispanic 
Black, non-Hispanic others, Hispanic), maternal age (<20, 20-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45+), 
maternal education (less than high school, high school, some college, university and 
above), insurance type (Medicaid, private insurance, self-pay, other), parity (0, 1, 2, 3+), 
an indicator of any maternal morbidity (maternal transfusion, third or fourth degree 
perineal laceration, ruptured uterus, unplanned hysterectomy, admission to intensive care 
unit, unplanned operating room procedure), an indicator of any risk factors during 
pregnancy (prepregnancy diabetes, gestational diabetes, prepregnancy hypertension, 
gestational hypertension, eclampsia, previous preterm birth, other previous poor 
pregnancy outcomes, pregnancy resulted from infertility treatment, mother had a previous 
cesarean delivery), an indicator of any infections during pregnancy (gonorrhea, syphilis, 
chlamydia, hepatitis B, hepatitis C), infant’s gender male (=1 if male, =0 if female), and 
an indicator of any congenital anomalies (anencephaly, meningomyelocele/spina bifida, 
cyanotic congenital heart disease, congenital diaphragmatic hernia, omphalocele, 
gastroschisis, limb reduction defect, cleft lip with or without cleft palate, cleft palate 
alone, down syndrome, suspected chromosomal disorder, hypospadias). These covariates 
were selected based on previous literature and the quality of variables (W. Harrison and 
Goodman 2015; W. N. Harrison, Wasserman, and Goodman 2018). For example, 




pregnancy was missing in California, Georgia, and Michigan for several years. I excluded 
these two variables in my analysis.  
In the aggregate-level infant mortality analysis, I controlled for the percent of 
moderately-low birthweight infants, preterm infants, and infants with congenital 
infections; percent of mothers that are non-Hispanic White, aged less than 35 years old, 
with less than high school education, with first birth order, have maternal morbidity, had 
risk factors during pregnancy, had maternal infections during pregnancy, and state-level 
characteristics as above. 
A3. Pre-trends Test 
The assumption of difference-in-differences, commonly referred to as the parallel 
trends assumption, is that the treatment group and the comparison group would have 
followed the same trend had the intervention never occurred. While the parallel trends 
assumption cannot be tested directly, following common practice I gauged how plausible 
the assumption was in the data by ascertaining whether the outcome trends in Maryland 
were parallel with trends in the comparison states in the years leading up to the start of 
the policy. 
The outcome graphs shown in the main paper (Figure 2.1) suggested reasonably 
parallel pre-trends in the NICU outcome. Figure A.1 and  Figure A.2 demonstrate the 
same thing for infant and neonatal mortality rates among all births, among moderately-
low birthweight (MLBW) and normal birthweight (NBW) births, and among moderately 
preterm and term births; and stratified for overall and for infants who were not admitted 




To obtain more formal statistical evidence I compared linear trends in Maryland 
and the comparison states using regressions based only on pre-period data (2011-2014). 
The first set of regressions, based on individual-level data, used the NICU admission 
indicator as the outcome. The predictors included the interaction of continuous year and 
the Maryland indicator and the full set of covariates and fixed effects. I estimated models 
in the full sample and in each birthweight category. Table A.2 reports the coefficients 
from the interaction term, its 95% confidence intervals, and the p-value (from the 
clustered robust method on the state level). Statistical inference was based on clustered 
robust standard errors which are known to over-reject the null hypotheses. Unfortunately, 
the bootstrap routine I used in the main analysis requires discrete time period dummies 
and I was unable to implement it in the pre-trends test because the time variable of 
interest was continuous. Furthermore, given the large sample, even small differences can 
be statistically significant. Thus, the statistical tests I employed in Table A.2 represent a 
conservative approach to identifying differential pre-trends. I found that the coefficients 
were quite small (compared to the baseline mean in Maryland) for all groups considered. 
The p-values were large or just crossed 0.05 for all groups, except for the very-low 
birthweight group. However, given that the point estimates were relatively small for all 
groups (relative to their baseline means) and that my approach to statistical inference in 
Table A.2 is known to over-reject the null, I interpreted Table A.2 as evidence in favor of 
the parallel trends assumption. 
I conducted a similar test of infant and neonatal mortality rates. For all groups, I 
found small coefficients and large p-values, suggesting there were no pre-existing trends 




A4. Effects by Year of Implementation  
Besides the average post-period effects shown in Table 2.2, I also estimated 
effects by the year of implementation. This alternative model allowed effects to flexibly 
evolve over each year of GBR. The analysis was conducted by changing the 
post*treatment interaction term with three interaction terms for each post-period year and 
the Maryland indicator. All other features of the model were the same.  
Table A.3 reports the coefficients from these interaction terms for all infants, 
MLBW, and NBW infants. I found that the effects of GBR grew over the study period for 
all three groups. For example, NICU admission rates for NBW infants decreased by 
13.2% in the first full year of the implementation and 35.6% in the third full year of the 
implementation.  
A5. Robustness to Alternative Comparison States 
I replicated the main model using alternative comparison states to test whether the 
results were sensitive to the choice of the control group. I first used all 33 states and DC 
that had NICU information regardless of their Medicaid expansion status. To further 
exclude the effect of the timing of Medicaid expansion, I next restricted the sample to the 
2014 expansion states.  
In Table A.4, I show that both the magnitude and significance of my results were 
unchanged with both sets of comparison states.  
A6. Robustness to Alternative Implementation Timing 
I chose to consider 2015 as the first year of implementation because hospitals 




and I expected that there would be a transition period as hospitals made adjustments to 
their strategies under the global budget environment. This decision differed from 
previous studies of the GBR program which used 2014 as the implementation year. 
Below I report how sensitive my results are to alternative implementation dates.  I either 
used January 2014 as other studies or July 2014.  
In Table A.5, I report difference-in-differences estimates using these two 
alternative implementation times. I observed slightly smaller coefficients using 2014 and 
July 2014 as the implementation time compared to 2015, but I came to the same basic 
conclusions. Finding smaller effects in these models, compared to my preferred 
specification, is consistent with the idea that the policy did not start to lead to changes in 
outcomes until 2015. 
A7. Robustness to Alternative Model Specifications 
I conducted several tests to examine if my results were sensitive to alternative 
model specifications. First, I examined how sensitive my results were to the set of 
included covariates by estimating unadjusted models that included only the difference-in-
differences interaction and the state and year fixed effects. I also examined if my main 
model results changed after including Apgar scores and an indicator of congenital 
anomalies. A linear probability model was used in our main analysis of NICU admissions 
for the ease in interpreting the coefficients and because it allowed us to generate p-values 
from a bootstrap method that properly accounted for auto-serial correlation in the 
presence of single treated cluster. However, I also investigated if using logistic 
regressions with state clustered standard errors suggested the same pattern of results as 




In Table A.6, I report the difference-in-differences coefficients from an 
unadjusted linear probability model (column 2) and the incremental effects implied by the 
logistic regression model based on my main set of covariates (column 3). I find consistent 
results using these alternative model specifications. 
A8. Robustness to Alternative Samples 
In this section, I examined whether my results are sensitive to certain changes of 
my study sample. I first tested whether the NICU admission results were robust to 
excluding Baltimore City and Baltimore County, which had an initiative (B'more for 
Healthy Babies) that led to improved infant health stating in 2009 (Baltimore City Health 
Department 2009). The coefficients became larger when removing Baltimore City and 
Baltimore County from our sample (Table A.7, column 1). The change in NICU 
admissions for all births was -1.77 percentage points (95% CI, -2.26 to -1.29), -7.45 
percentage points (95% CI, -9.07 to -5.82) for VLBW infants, -7.75 percentage points 
(95% CI, -8.98 to -6. 51) for MLBW infants, -1.41 percentage points (95% CI, -1.88 to -
0.94) for NBW infants, and -1.36 percentage points (95% CI, -1.81 to -0.90) for HBW 
infants. However, my general conclusions were unchanged from the preferred model. 
I also re-estimated the model by restricting the sample to state residents, as five 
hospitals (University of Maryland Medical Center, Johns Hopkins Hospital, Johns 
Hopkins Bayview, and Johns Hopkins Suburban, and University of Maryland Shock 
Trauma) were exempt for nonresident services from their budgets in 2014 (Giuriceo et al. 
2016). The University of Maryland facilities’ budgets stopped excluding nonresident 
revenues starting in FY 2015. The results are shown in Table A.7 (column 2). Even 




provided to out-of-state patients as a way to increase their revenues, the population of 
non-residents was smaller and excluding them didn’t change much to my main results. 
The preferred sample included all births, including births at rural hospitals that 
had previously been under the pilot program. However, none of these hospitals have a 
NICU facility. I also included births delivered at birthing centers. While I believe that 
infants who were delivered in rural hospitals or birth centers should also be affected by 
GBR via transfers, I re-ran the model by restricting the sample to urban and hospital 
births only. The coefficients are quite similar such that our results were not sensitive to 
the inclusion or exclusion of those facilities (Table A.7, column 3). 
A9. The Impact of GBR on Infant Health 
I interpreted the results as suggesting that the GBR program reduced NICU 
admissions, holding health at birth constant. However, it is also possible that GBR could 
have reduced NICU services by improving health at birth. Such effects may have been 
controlled out of the preferred model by including infant and maternal health 
characteristics as covariates.  
Nonetheless, to investigate if GBR had impacts on health at birth, I used our 
difference-in-differences model to examine indicators of infant health. The indicators I 
used were preterm (less than 37 weeks of gestational age), small for gestational age 
(SGA), average birthweight, and average gestational age. An infant was defined as SGA 
if her/his birthweight was lower than the tenth percentile of birthweight at a given 
gestational age (in weeks) (Fenton and Kim 2013). The SGA was calculated based on 




Figure A.3 shows the trends for these four outcomes in Maryland and the 
comparison states. Compared to other states, Maryland had a higher rate of preterm births 
and the trends started to diverge in Maryland versus the comparison states prior to GBR. 
As such, results for the preterm indicator should be interpreted with caution. The trends 
in all outcomes appeared quite similar between Maryland and comparison states before 
GBR.   
In Table A.8, I show the difference-in-differences estimates using these four 
measures as outcome variables. I did not find evidence that the GBR was associated with 
any health outcome considered. These findings provide additional evidence that GBR 
effects on NICU use arise from changes to practice patterns rather than changes to health 
at birth.  
A10. Measurement Error in NICU Admissions 
An important concern with our results is whether differential misclassification of 
NICU admission biased our findings. To better understand if that issue influenced our 
results, I compared NICU admission rates from hospital discharge data in Maryland, as 
obtained from the State Inpatient Database of the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project 
(HCUP), to NICU rates observed in Vital Statistics.  
In the Vital Statistics, NICU admission is defined as “admission into a facility or 
unit staffed and equipped to provide continuous mechanical ventilator support for the 
newborn”(National Center for Health Statistics 2012). The guidelines for completing the 
Birth Certificate through Facility Worksheets define the NICU admission as “include 




include units that do not provide continuous mechanical ventilation. Do not include well-
baby nurseries or special care nurseries (i.e., Level II nursery). Do not include if the 
newborn was taken to the NICU for observation but is not admitted to the NICU”. The 
definition from the Vital Statistics, therefore, attached the NICU admission to a facility or 
unit. 
In the HCUP, there’s no NICU admission indicator. A common approach to 
classify NICU admission using discharge data is following AAP’s definition which 
defines a NICU as either a level III or level IV nursery and measuring the NICU 
admission using revenue codes that denoted level III or level IV nursery care (revenue 
code = 0173 or 0174) (Goodman et al. 2019). However, the assigned revenue code 
corresponds to the level of care determined during the clinical evaluation rather than the 
level of facility (Maryland Department of Health 2017; New York State Department of 
Health 2012). As stated on New York State’s Statewide Planning and Research 
Cooperative System, “The levels of care and resulting revenue codes may, and likely 
will, fluctuate during the infants stay in the facility.” (New York State Department of 
Health 2012)  
Because the higher-level facilities includes the capabilities of previous levels 
(Kilpatrick, Papile, and Macones 2017), I expected the NICU admission rate from the 
Vital Statistics (VS) data to be higher compared to the HCUP data.  I graphed the trends 
of the NICU admission rate for all births and by birthweight groups using each data set. 
The NICU admission in the HCUP data was measured using revenue codes that denoted 




Figure A.4 depicts NICU admission rates. While the levels were expectedly 
different, the trends of the NICU admission rate were generally similar among all groups 
except for the very-low birthweight group. The Vital Statistics suggested an upward trend 
in NICU admissions during the pre-period that was absent in the HCUP. The different 
trends in this group could reflect transfers that are captured with varying levels of 
accuracy in the Vital Statistics, but are expected to be more accurately measured in the 
HCUP. However, because the two data sources use different definitions of NICU 
services, I cannot confidently determine if differences in trend reflect measurement error 
or real changes in service use. While the differing trends in the VLBW group are 
somewhat concerning, the HCUP suggests very little change in its measure of NICU 
utilization among VBLW infants. That is consistent with our conclusions based on the 
analysis of the VS data featured in the main paper. Further, the HCUP does suggest 
declines in NICU admission for MLBW and NBW infants consistent with the 
implementation of GBR and the findings I present in the main paper. 
A11. Synthetic Control Methods Estimates 
Besides the preferred difference-in-differences design, I also explored an 
alternative approach, the synthetic control method (SCM), to estimate the effects of GBR. 
It’s an increasingly popular method for policy evaluation and uses a data-driven approach 
for selecting a comparison group that is a weighted average of all states (Abadie, 
Diamond, and Hainmueller 2015). Non-negative weights are chosen to minimize the 
difference in outcomes during the pre-period, which ensures that pre-period trends are as 
similar as possible for the treatment unit and synthetic unit. I consider the same group of 




with the concerns from Medicaid expansion and facilitate comparison between models of 
DID and SCM. Treatment effects are then measured as the mean differences between 
Maryland and the synthetic Maryland in the post-period. The statistical inference for 
SCM is based on a permutation-based test where it assigned the treatment to each state in 
the donor pool and re-estimates the model, resulting in a series of placebo treatment 
effects. A p-value is then calculated as the probability that the original treatment effects 
surpass all other placebo ones by ranking the ratios of post/pre-intervention mean squared 
prediction error (MSPE). I used all the pre-treatment outcomes as my predictors 
following previous literature (Bilgel and Galle 2015; Kreif et al. 2016). There might be 
some concerns regarding including pre-treatment outcomes only as the predictors (Kaul 
et al. 2018) and there hasn’t come to a consensus on the inclusion criteria of covariates 
(Botosaru and Ferman 2019), while I find that the results using the pre-treatment 
outcomes in SCM are quite similar to those using the DID, plus balanced covariates 
through conducting a balance test, suggesting the potential bias could be trivial.   
Figure A.5 depicts Maryland and synthetic Maryland for the overall group. The 
pre-treatment trends between Maryland and synthetic Maryland are matched quite well 
before 2015. After 2015, the NICU admission rate decreased substantially in Maryland 
while it keeps increasing in synthetic Maryland. The average post-period NICU 
admission decreased 0.78 percentage points, corresponding to a 10.4% decrease from the 
baseline rate in Maryland. Table A.9 shows the list of states that contribute to the 
comparison group. Twenty states contributed in roughly equal proportions.  
Table A.10 presents the results using the synthetic control method for overall and 




also significant in the overall group. Changes were small in other groups or insignificant. 
As mentioned above to calculate p-values, Figure A.6 depicts the ratio of post/pre-
intervention MSPE ratios for Maryland and 20 comparison states where Maryland ranks 
the first. The exact p-value, i.e. the probability of obtaining a post/pre-intervention MSPE 
ratio as large as Maryland’s for overall group, is 1/21=0.48.  
Table A.11 compares the size of effects from the DID method and the synthetic 
control method. The direction of the effects is consistent using these two methods, and 
the decreases are consistently significant for overall and for the MLBW group. 
A12. Dynamic Difference-in-Differences Estimates 
In addition to the average treatment effects, I explored the dynamic difference-in-
differences results by replacing the interaction term of treatment dummy and the pre-post 
dummy with a series of interactions of the year and the treatment status. The estimated 
coefficients were standardized where the year before 2015 was taken as the baseline level 
with a coefficient as zero. Figure A.7 presents the results from the dynamic models for all 
births and by birthweight, where the dashed orange lines indicated the 95% confidence 
interval from standard errors clustered at the state level.   
A13. Models with State-specific Linear Trends 
There are some mild violations of pre-trend tests as shown in Table A.2. 
Following Wolfers (2006), I add the state-specific linear trend into the models and 
replace the interaction term with separate interactions of treatment status and post-period 
dummies for the years 2015, 2016, and 2017 (Wolfers 2006). This is to prevent the added 




Table A.13 presents the results while adding state-specific linear trends. Cluster 
robust standard errors at the state level are reported. I now find a larger impact among 
VLBW infants which reaches 11.4% decrease in the year 2017. I find declines among 
MLBW infants that are substantial and consistent right after the implementation of GBR. 
The changes among NBW and HBW infants are trivial in the first two years while 
becoming significant and substantial heading into the third year. Overall, the findings are 
consistent with those from my preferred difference-in-differences setting.   
Table A.1: Comparison States 
State Expansion Date   State Expansion Date 
California* 2014   Nevada 2014 
Colorado 2014   New Hampshire 2015 
Delaware Early   New Mexico 2014 
District of 
Columbia 
Early   New York Early 
Florida Never   North Dakota 2014 
Georgia Never   Ohio 2014 
Idaho Never   Oklahoma Never 
Illinois 2014   Oregon Early 
Indiana 2015   Pennsylvania 2015 
Iowa 2014   South Carolina Never 
Kansas Never   South Dakota Never 
Kentucky 2014   Tennessee Never 
Maryland 2014   Texas Never 
Michigan 2014   Utah Never 
Missouri Never   Vermont Early 
Montana 2016   Washington 2014 
Nebraska Never   Wyoming Never 
Note. The listed states are those that implemented the 2003 version of the U.S. Birth 
Certificate early or at the same time as Maryland. The states in bold are used in the 






Table A.2: Differential Pre-Trends Test, 2011-2014 





   
All -0.12 (-0.31,0.08) 0.23 
Very-low Birthweight 1.48 (0.26,2.70) 0.02 
Moderately-low Birthweight 0.21 (-0.61,1.02) 0.6 
Normal Birthweight -0.17 (-0.33,-0.01) 0.04 
High Birthweight -0.23 (-0.46,0.01) 0.06 
Very Preterm 1.17 (0.06,2.29) 0.04 
Moderately Preterm -0.07 (-0.77,0.63) 0.84 
Term -0.16 (-0.32,0.01) 0.06 
Postterm -0.23 (-0.67,0.21) 0.29 
Infant Mortality Rate 
   
All 0.21 (-0.12,0.55) 0.2 
MLBW and NBW 0.19 (-0.01,0.40) 0.06 
MLBW and NBW & Not 
Admitted to NICU 
0.2 (-0.03,0.43) 0.09 
MPT and Term 0.2 (-0.01,0.41) 0.06 
MPT and Term & Not 
Admitted to NICU 
-0.002 (-0.20,0.20) 0.98 
Neonatal Mortality Rate 
   
All -0.05 (-0.33,0.23) 0.71 
MLBW and NBW -0.0001 (-0.20,0.20) 1 
MLBW and NBW & Not 
Admitted to NICU 
-0.01 (-0.20,0.18) 0.91 
MPT and Term -0.002 (-0.20,0.20) 0.98 
MPT and Term & Not 
Admitted to NICU 
-0.004 (-0.19,0.18) 0.96 
Note. The coefficients and 95% CIs for NICU admissions outcomes are in 
percentage point. Models control for the same covariates as the preferred 










Table A.3: Difference-in-Differences Estimates of the Effect of GBR on NICU Admission 





















    
Year 1 7.49 -0.62 (-1.03,-0.22) 0.005 -8.28 
Year 2 7.49 -1.07 (-1.52,-0.62) <0.001 -14.29 
Year 3 7.49 -2.13 (-2.81,-1.45) <0.001 -28.44 
MLBW (N=591,120) 
    
Year 1 37.37 -1.88 (-3.32,-0.43) 0.013 -5.03 
Year 2 37.37 -3.5 (-4.70,-2.31) <0.001 -9.37 
Year 3 37.37 -8.17 (-9.53,-6.81) <0.001 -21.86 
NBW (N=10,238,271) 
    
Year 1 4.77 -0.63 (-1.00,-0.26) 0.002 -13.21 
Year 2 4.77 -1 (-1.44,-0.57) <0.001 -20.96 
Year 3 4.77 -1.7 (-2.36,-1.04) <0.001 -35.64 
Note. Models control for birthweight (in full and gestation analyses), gestational age (in 
full and birthweight analyses), mother's age, race, education level, insurance type, parity, 
maternal morbidities, infections, and risks, infant's sex and congenital anomalies, state-
level poverty rate, unemployment rate, birth rate, NICU beds per 1,000 population, and 
state and year fixed effects. The coefficients and 95% CIs are in percentage points. 
Standard errors are clustered at the state level. P-values are from clustered robust 
standard errors. The baseline rate refers to the average admission rate before GBR in 












Table A.4: Difference-in-Differences Estimates of the Effect of GBR on NICU Admission using Alternative Control States, 2011-2017 
Dependent Variable: NICU 
Admission  
Main Model All States All 2014 Expansion States 
  (1)     (2)     (3)   
Coef. 95% CIs 
Bootstrap 
P-Value 
Coef. 95% CIs 
Bootstrap 
P-Value 
Coef. 95% CIs 
Bootstrap 
P-Value 
          
All -1.26 (-1.76,-0.76) 0.03 -1.26 (-1.59,-0.93) 0.03 -1.06 (-1.79,-0.32) 0.03 
          
Very-low Birthweight -0.95 (-2.58,0.69) 0.59 -0.33 (-1.43,0.77) 0.91 -1.94 (-4.51,0.63) 0.15 
          
Moderately-low Birthweight -4.5 (-5.71,-3.29) 0.003 -4.36 (-5.25,-3.47) 0.04 -4.45 (-7.02,-1.89) 0.02 
 
   
      
Normal Birthweight -1.1 (-1.58,-0.62) 0.04 -1.11 (-1.42,-0.80) 0.02 -0.89 (-1.53,-0.25) 0.04 
 
   
      
High Birthweight -0.84 (-1.36,-0.31) 0.13 -0.9 (-1.25,-0.56) 0.18 -0.5 (-1.29,0.29) 0.31 
                    
Note. The baseline rate/mean for Maryland are calculated using data from 2011 to 2014. The coefficients and 95% CIs are in 
percentage points. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. P-values are obtained using a bootstrap approach, as developed by 
Ferman and Pinto (2019). The estimations are from separate regressions for all births and for each birthweight cohort. Models control 
for birthweight (in full and gestation analyses), gestational age (in full and birthweight analyses), mother's age, race, education level, 
insurance type, parity, maternal morbidities, infections, and risks, infant's sex and congenital anomalies, state-level poverty rate, 





Table A.5: Difference-in-Differences Estimates of the Effect of GBR on NICU Admission using Alternative Post-Implementation Time, 
2011-2017 
Dependent Variable: NICU 
Admission  
Main Model Fiscal Year 2014 Calendar Year 2014 
  (1)     (2)     (3)   
Coef. 95% CIs 
Bootstrap 
P-Value 
Coef. 95% CIs 
Bootstrap 
P-Value 
Coef. 95% CIs 
Bootstrap 
P-Value 
          
All -1.26 (-1.76,-0.76) 0.03 -1.18 (-1.67,-0.70) 0.09 -1.12 (-1.62,-0.62) 0.05 
          
Very-low Birthweight -0.95 (-2.58,0.69) 0.59 -0.25 (-2.18,1.67) 0.9 0.6 (-1.77,2.97) 0.76 
          
Moderately-low Birthweight -4.5 (-5.71,-3.29) 0.003 -4.2 (-5.57,-2.82) 0.06 -3.8 (-5.43,-2.17) 0.06 
 
   
      
Normal Birthweight -1.1 (-1.58,-0.62) 0.04 -1.04 (-1.50,-0.58) 0.11 -1.01 (-1.47,-0.55) 0.06 
 
   
      
High Birthweight -0.84 (-1.36,-0.31) 0.13 -0.82 (-1.33,-0.32) 0.26 -0.93 (-1.46,-0.41) 0.15 
                    
Note. The baseline rate/mean for Maryland are calculated using data from 2011 to 2014. The coefficients and 95% CIs are in 
percentage points. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. P-values are obtained using a bootstrap approach, as developed by 
Ferman and Pinto (2019). The estimations are from separate regressions for all births and for each birthweight cohort. Models control 
for birthweight (in full and gestation analyses), gestational age (in full and birthweight analyses), mother's age, race, education level, 
insurance type, parity, maternal morbidities, infections, and risks, infant's sex and congenital anomalies, state-level poverty rate, 





Table A.6: Difference-in-Differences Estimates of the Effect of GBR on NICU Admission using Alternative Control States, 2011-2017 
Dependent Variable: 
NICU Admission  
Main Model Unadjusted Model Logistic Regression 
  (1)     (2)     (3)   
Coef. 95% CIs 
Bootstrap 
P-Value 










          
All -1.26 (-1.76,-0.76) 0.03 -1.01 (-1.33,-0.69) 0.12 -1.18 (-1.53,-0.83) <0.001 
          
Very-low 
Birthweight 
-0.95 (-2.58,0.69) 0.59 -1.39 (-3.24,0.47) 0.48 -1.62 (-2.94,-0.29) 0.017 
          
Moderately-low 
Birthweight 
-4.5 (-5.71,-3.29) 0.003 -4.38 (-5.17,-3.58) 0.06 -4.53 (-5.69,-3.38) <0.001 
 
   
      
Normal Birthweight -1.1 (-1.58,-0.62) 0.04 -0.89 (-1.22,-0.57) 0.11 -1.03 (-1.36,-0.70) <0.001 
 
   
      
High Birthweight -0.84 (-1.36,-0.31) 0.13 -0.56 (-0.89,-0.24) 0.33 -0.76 (-1.10,-0.42) <0.001 
                    
Note. The baseline rate/mean for Maryland are calculated using data from 2011 to 2014.  The coefficients and 95% CIs are in 
percentage points. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. The estimations are from separate regressions for all births and for 
each birthweight cohort. Models control for birthweight (in full and gestation analyses), gestational age (in full and birthweight 
analyses), mother's age, race, education level, insurance type, parity, maternal morbidities, infections, and risks, infant's sex and 
congenital anomalies, state-level poverty rate, unemployment rate, birth rate, NICU beds per 1,000 population, and state and year 
fixed effects. Bootstrap P-values are obtained using a bootstrap approach, as developed by Ferman and Pinto (2019). Cluster robust p-




Table A.7: Difference-in-Differences Estimates of the Effect of GBR on NICU Admission using Alternative Samples, 2011-2017 
Dependent Variable:  
NICU Admission  
Excluding Baltimore City and 
County 
Residents Only 
Hospital & Urban County Births 
Only 
(1) (2) (3) 
Coef. 95% CIs 
Bootstrap 
P-Value 
Coef. 95% CIs 
Bootstrap 
P-Value 
Coef. 95% CIs 
Bootstrap 
P-Value 
          
All -1.77 (-2.26,-1.29) 0.003 -1.24 (-1.74,-0.74) 0.04 -1.2 (-1.70,-0.70) 0.05 
          
Very-low 
Birthweight 
-7.45 (-9.07,-5.82) 0.001 -1.28 (-2.95,0.40) 0.49 -0.67 (-2.33,1.00) 0.65 
          
Moderately-low 
Birthweight 
-7.75 (-8.98,-6.51) 0.002 -4.19 (-5.40,-2.98) 0.01 -3.98 (-5.19,-2.76) 0.01 
          
Normal Birthweight -1.41 (-1.88,-0.94) 0.02 -1.11 (-1.58,-0.63) 0.04 -1.08 (-1.56,-0.60) 0.05 
          
High Birthweight -1.36 (-1.81,-0.90) 0.07 -0.77 (-1.31,-0.23) 0.18 -0.79 (-1.33,-0.24) 0.19 
                    
Note. The baseline rate/mean for Maryland are calculated using data from 2011 to 2014.  The coefficients and 95% CIs are in 
percentage points. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. P-values are obtained using a bootstrap approach, as developed by 
Ferman and Pinto (2019). The estimations are from separate regressions for all births and for each birthweight cohort. Models control 
for birthweight (in full and gestation analyses), gestational age (in full and birthweight analyses), mother's age, race, education level, 
insurance type, parity, maternal morbidities, infections, and risks, infant's sex and congenital anomalies, state-level poverty rate, 










Maryland  Coef. 95% CIs 
Bootstrap P-
Value 
     
Preterm, % 10.11 -0.08 (-0.32,0.17) 0.73 
     
SGA, % 8.55 -0.34 (-0.45,-0.23) 0.73 
     
Average Birthweight, gram 3306.67 5.67 (1.60,9.73) 0.4 
     




38.66 0.02 (-2.58,2.62) 0.99 
          
Note. The baseline rate/mean for Maryland are calculated using data from 2011 to 2014.  The 
coefficients and 95% CIs of preterm and SGA models are in percentage points. Standard errors 
are clustered at the state level. P-values are obtained using a bootstrap approach, as developed 
by Ferman and Pinto (2019). Models control for mother's age, race, education level, insurance 
type, parity, maternal morbidity, infection, and risk, infant's sex, state-level poverty rate, 
unemployment rate, birth rate, NICU beds per 1,000 population, and state and year fixed 




Table A.9: State Weights for the Synthetic Maryland 
  Overall VLBW MLBW NBW HBW 
California 0.025 0.036 0.049 0 0.016 
Colorado 0.028 0.029 0.046 0 0.018 
Delaware 0.005 0.144 0.02 0 0.011 
District Of Columbia 0.016 0.021 0.049 0 0.06 
Illinois 0.281 0.033 0.046 0.395 0.014 
Indiana 0.034 0.022 0.043 0 0.016 
Iowa 0.029 0.025 0.031 0 0.021 
Kentucky 0.038 0.023 0.05 0 0.021 
Michigan 0.02 0.027 0.071 0 0.305 
Montana 0.019 0.016 0.047 0 0.018 
Nevada 0.255 0.035 0.036 0.352 0.264 
New Hampshire 0.027 0.03 0.046 0.093 0.013 
New Mexico 0.013 0.242 0.133 0 0.014 
New York 0.037 0.032 0.036 0 0.017 
North Dakota 0.017 0.036 0.026 0 0.01 
Ohio 0.018 0.028 0.045 0 0.016 
Oregon 0.038 0.11 0.037 0.16 0.122 
Pennsylvania 0.054 0.029 0.041 0 0.019 
Vermont 0.029 0.021 0.112 0 0.008 
Washington 0.017 0.062 0.037 0 0.018 
 















Overall 7.5 -0.78 0.05 -10.4%* 
VLBW 83.7 -3.41 0.24 -4.10% 
MLBW 37.4 -6.2 0.05 -16.6%* 
NBW 4.8 -0.49 0.33 -10.20% 
HBW 5.9 -0.05 0.19 -0.90% 
Note. The birthweight categories were defined as: very-low birthweight (VLBW, 500-
1,499g), moderately-low birthweight (MLBW, 1,500-2,499g), normal birthweight 
(NBW, 2,500-3,999g), and high birthweight (HBW, 4,000g and above). Data comes 




Table A.11: Comparing Estimates from DID versus SCM 
NICU Admission, % 
Average Baseline 
Admission Rate in 
Maryland  




Overall 7.5 -16.8%* -10.4%* 
VLBW 83.7  -1.1% -4.10% 
MLBW 37.4 -12.0%* -16.6%* 
NBW 4.8 -23.1%* -10.20% 
HBW 5.9 -14.20% -0.90% 
Note. The birthweight categories were defined as: very-low birthweight (VLBW, 500-
1,499g), moderately-low birthweight (MLBW, 1,500-2,499g), normal birthweight (NBW, 
2,500-3,999g), and high birthweight (HBW, 4,000g and above). Data comes from the 
2011-2017 Vital Statistics. * denotes p<0.05. 
 
Table A.12: The Difference-in-Differences Estimates including State-specific Linear 
Trends, 2011-2017 
  All VLBW MLBW NBW HBW 
      
Year 1 -0.03 -5.68 -2.19 -0.04 1.3 
 
(-0.29,0.22) (-6.97,-4.39) (-2.91,-1.47) (-0.28,0.21) (1.04,1.56) 
Year 2 -0.67 -4.15 -5.01 -0.38 0.59 
 
(-1.19,-0.16) (-6.96,-1.34) (-6.29,-3.74) (-0.83,0.08) (0.13,1.06) 
Year 3 -1.34 -9.57 -9.91 -0.83 -0.88 
 
(-2.04,-0.64) (-14.03,-5.11) (-11.90,-7.92) (-1.43,-0.23) (-1.56,-0.21) 




7.5 83.7 37.4 4.8 5.9 
Relative 
Effect at Year 
3 
-17.80% -11.40% -26.50% -17.30% -14.90% 
N 11,965,997 104,356 591,120 10,238,271 1,032,250 
Note. The birthweight categories were defined as: very-low birthweight (VLBW, 500-1,499g), 
moderately-low birthweight (MLBW, 1,500-2,499g), normal birthweight (NBW, 2,500-3,999g), 
and high birthweight (HBW, 4,000g and above). Standard errors in the parentheses are clustered 
at the state level. Data comes from the 2011-2017 Vital Statistics.      






Table A.13: Characteristics of Mothers Before and After GBR, 2011-2017  





















     Maternal Race 
     Non-Hispanic White 47.66 44.55 54.17 52.83 0.06 
Non-Hispanic Black 30.94 30.10 10.86 10.48 0.38 
Non-Hispanic Other 7.97 9.70 9.48 11.51 0.61 
Hispanic 13.43 15.65 25.49 25.18 0.00 
Maternal Age, years 
     <20 5.74 4.21 6.89 4.96 0.21 
20-24 18.97 16.37 21.73 19.37 0.57 
25-34 57.40 59.13 55.27 57.63 0.38 
35-44 17.65 20.01 15.93 17.83 0.39 
45+ 0.24 0.29 0.18 0.22 0.92 
Maternal Education  
     Less than High School 13.28 12.37 16.72 13.84 0.14 
High School 20.81 20.70 24.32 24.52 0.80 
Some College 27.98 27.04 28.58 28.62 0.36 
University and Above 37.93 39.88 30.38 33.02 0.49 
Maternal Insurance  
     Medicaid 33.44 39.29 43.38 42.63 0.03 
Private Insurance 57.72 53.34 49.53 50.80 0.04 
Self-Pay 3.31 3.29 3.05 3.15 0.82 
Other  5.53 4.08 4.04 3.42 0.50 
Parity 
     First 41.58 39.50 40.48 39.12 0.36 
Second 33.21 33.64 31.84 32.33 0.92 
Third or Higher 25.21 26.87 27.67 28.55 0.29 
Any Indications of Maternal Infection 2.35 2.49 2.14 2.39 0.78 
Any Indications of Maternal Morbidity 2.43 1.34 1.60 1.47 0.05 
Any Indications of Maternal Pregnancy 
Risk 30.56 33.64 27.25 28.70 0.34 
Infant Characteristics 
     Infant with Any Indications of 
Congenital Anomaly 0.32 0.41 0.30 0.36 0.73 
Infant Male 51.16 50.99 51.22 51.23 0.25 
Infant Birthweight  




Moderately-Low 5.41 5.60 4.83 5.04 0.88 
Normal 85.04 84.72 85.63 85.53 0.26 
High 8.47 8.53 8.69 8.56 0.36 
Infant Gestational Age  
     Very Preterm 1.26 1.29 1.00 0.99 0.35 
Moderately Preterm 6.65 6.87 6.13 6.29 0.86 
Term 91.77 91.58 92.38 92.30 0.64 
Postterm 0.32 0.27 0.49 0.42 0.76 
State Characteristics 
     Poverty Rate 800.00 733.39 1289.48 1126.99 0.11 
Unemployment Rate 670.77 506.94 840.60 574.98 0.24 
Birth Rate 1231.59 1202.90 1244.37 1197.71 0.49 
NICU Bed, per 1,000 pop 6.58 6.47 5.80 5.64 0.94 
Note. The sample excludes those with birthweight less than 500g or unknown, non-singleton 
births, and those with missing values. The baseline period is from 2011 to 2014. Comparison 
states include 19 states and the District of Columbia that collected NICU admission information 
in our study period and adopted the ACA Medicaid Expansion as Maryland did. The full list of 
comparison states is provided in Table A.1. The birthweight categories were defined as: very-
low birthweight (VLBW, 500-1,499g), moderately-low birthweight (MLBW, 1,500-2,499g), 
normal birthweight (NBW, 2,500-3,999g), and high birthweight (HBW, 4,000g and above). The 
gestation categories were defined as: very preterm (<32 weeks), moderately preterm (32-36 


























Figure A.1:  Unadjusted Trends of Infant Mortality Rate, 2011-2017 
A.  All Births 
 
B.   Subgroups 
 
Source: 2011-2017 Natality Files and Period Linked Birth-Infant Death Data Files. Note. 
Comparison states included 19 states and DC. MLBW refers to moderately-low 
birthweight (1,500-2,499g); NBW refers to normal birthweight (2,500-3,999g); MPT 




Figure A.2: Unadjusted Trends of Neonatal Mortality Rate, 2011-2017 
      A.  All Infants 
 
B.   Subgroups 
 
Source: 2011-2017 Natality Files and Period Linked Birth-Infant Death Data Files. 
Note. Comparison states included 19 states and DC. MLBW refers to moderately-low 
birthweight (1,500-2,499g); NBW refers to normal birthweight (2,500-3,999g); MPT 




Figure A.3: Unadjusted Trends of Other Health Outcomes, 2011-2017 
 


















B. By Birthweight 
  
Source: 2011-2017 Maryland’s State Inpatient Database of the Healthcare Cost and 
Utilization Project (HCUP). Note. The NICU admission in the HCUP data was 
defined as the use of level III or level IV nursery care. The birthweight categories 
were defined as: very-low birthweight (VLBW, 500-1,499g), moderately-low 
birthweight (MLBW, 1,500-2,499g), normal birthweight (NBW, 2,500-3,999g), and 












Figure A.6: Ratio of Post/Pre-GBR Mean Squared Prediction Error, Overall 
 
 

















   Appendix B
B1. Data Sources 
Table B.1: Sources of Covariates 
Variables ICD-9 ICD-10 
Hospital Born Infant V3000, V3001, V3100, V3101, 
V3200, V3201, V3300, V3301, 
V3400, V3401, V3500, V3501, 
V3600, V3601, V3700, V3701, 
V3900, V3901 
Z3800, Z3801, Z3820, 
Z3830, Z3831, Z3850, 
Z3880, Z386 
Gestational Age     
<=32 weeks 76521 76522 76523 76524 
76525 76526  
P0721-P0726 P0731-P0735 
33-36 weeks 76527 76528 P0736-P0739 
>=37 weeks  76621 76622 or not indicated P0821 P0822 or not indicated 
Birth Method     
C-section V3001 Z3801 
Vaginal Birth V3000 Z3800 
Having Respiratory Distress 
Syndrome 
769 P220 












Table B.2: Sources of Outcome Variables 
Variables Revenue Codes 
Nursery   
NICU Care 0173, 0174 
Special Care  0172 
Imaging 
 Chest X-ray 0324 
Head CT Scan 0351 
Body CT Scan 0352 
Ultrasound 0402 
Brain MRI 0611 
Head/Neck MRI 0615 
Respiratory Services 
 General 0410 




By Cost Center 
 Clinics 076*, 090*,091*,100* 
Special Care Units 020*, 021* 
Routine Bed Units 011*, 012*, 013*, 014*, 015*, 016* 
Nursery, Labor/Delivery 017*, 072* 
All Other Ancillary 028*, 048*, 068* 
Operating Room 036*, 037*, 045*, 071* 
Therapies 041*, 042*, 043*, 044*, 046*  
Pharmacy 025*, 027*, 062*, 063*  
Laboratory 
030*, 031*, 032*, 033*, 034*, 035*, 
040*, 061* 









Table B.3: Sources of Congenital Anomalies 
Category 
CCS-





213 7450 74510 74511 74512 
74519 7452 7453 7454 
7455 74560 74561 74569 
7457 7458 7459 74600 
74601 74602 74609 7461 
7462 7463 7464 7465 7466 
7467 74681 74682 74683 
74684 74685 74686 74687 
74689 7469 7470 74710 
74711 74720 74721 74722 
74729 7473 74731 74732 
74739 74740 74741 74742 
74749 7475 7476 74760 
74761 74762 74763 74764 
74769 74781 74782 74783 
74789 7479 V1365  
Q256 Q212 Q219 Q204 Q244 
Q205 Q262 Q249 Q234 Q265 
Q2572 Q263 Q269 Q252 Q241 
Q2579 Q254 Q240 Q250 Q231 
Q255 Q245 Q251 Q218 Q233 
Q232 Q230 Q229 Q210 Q238 
Q213 Q203 Q2732 Q246 Q270 
Q289 Q248 Q208 Q272 Q225 
Q209 Q268 Q220 Q288 Q222 
Z8774 Q282 Q200 Q243 Q278 
Q283 Q260 Q2731 Q201 Q261 
Q253 Q211 Q279 Q242 Q2571 




214 7500 75010 75011 75012 
75013 75015 75016 75019 
75021 75022 75023 75024 
75025 75026 75027 75029 
7503 7504 7505 7506 7507 
7508 7509 7510 7511 7512 
7513 7514 7515 75160 
75161 75162 75169 7517 
7518 7519 V1367 
Q450 Q383 Q408 Q443 Q400 
Q459 Q395 Q392 Q419 Q444 
Q453 Q451 Q441 Q429 Q390 
Q438 Q437 Q388 Q435 Q458 
Q446 Q396 Q445 Q442 
Z87738 Q401 Q384 Q434 
Q394 Q385 Q430 Q433 Q381 
Q402 Q398 Q387 Q393 Q391 
Q447 Q409 Q431 Q386 Q380 




215 7520 75210 75211 75219 
7522 7523 75231 75232 
75233 75234 75235 75236 
75239 75240 75241 75242 
75243 75244 75245 75246 
75247 75249 7525 75251 
75252 7526 75261 75262 
75263 75264 75265 75269 
7527 7528 75281 75289 
7529 7530 7531 75310 
75311 75312 75313 75314 
75315 75316 75317 75319 
7532 75320 75321 75322 
75323 75329 7533 7534 
7535 7536 7537 7538 7539 
V1361 V1362  
Q631 Q51821 Q605 Q624 
Q6471 Q618 Q5210 Q633 
Q51810 Q5521 Q644 Q6410 
Q638 Q5279 Q6210 Q5212 
Q6261 Q553 Q6119 Q5002 
Q520 Q6474 Q551 Q514 Q513 
Q512 Q559 Q630 Q516 Q515 
Q6101 Q5031 Q5522 Q6473 
Q524 Q602 Q563 Q628 Q619 
Q6231 Q5523 Q51820 Q6419 
Q6433 Q649 Q5032 Q526 
Q504 Q6263 Q51811 Q6439 
Q510 Q5529 Q544 Z87718 
Q615 Q645 Q51828 Q558 
Q5001 Q614 Q5562 Q5270 
Q5110 Z87710 Q625 Q522 
Q506 Q6239 Q550 Q640 
Q6212 Q632 Q523 Q612 
Q6432 Q529 Q5039 Q6431 




Q6475 Q6479 Q6262 Q6100 
Q5271 Q6211 Q613 Q5564 
Q505 Q6102 Q5563 Q51818 





216 7400 7401 7402 74100 
74101 74102 74103 74190 
74191 74192 74193 7420 
7421 7422 7423 7424 
74251 74253 74259 7428 
7429 V1363  
Q001 Q042 Q062 Z87728 
Q046 Q064 Q078 Q0703 Q052 
Q038 Q079 Q041 Q031 Q019 
Q054 Q058 Q0702 Q02 Q055 
Q043 Q000 Q051 G901 Q068 
Q002 Q057 Q063 Q0701 Q045 





217 74300 74303 74306 74310 
74311 74312 74320 74321 
74322 74330 74331 74332 
74333 74334 74335 74336 
74337 74339 74341 74342 
74343 74344 74345 74346 
74347 74348 74349 74351 
74352 74353 74354 74355 
74356 74357 74358 74359 
74361 74362 74363 74364 
74365 74366 74369 7438 
7439 74400 74401 74402 
74403 74404 74405 74409 
7441 74421 74422 74423 
74424 74429 7443 74441 
74442 74443 74446 74447 
74449 7445 74481 74482 
74483 74484 74489 7449 
7480 7481 7482 7483 7484 
7485 74860 74861 74869 
7488 7489 74900 74901 
74902 74903 74904 74910 
74911 74912 74913 74914 
74920 74921 74922 74923 
74924 74925 7540 7541 
7542 75430 75431 75432 
75433 75435 75440 75441 
75442 75443 75444 75450 
75451 75452 75453 75459 
75460 75461 75462 75469 
75470 75471 75479 75481 
75482 75489 75500 75501 
75502 75510 75511 75512 
75513 75514 75520 75521 
75522 75523 75524 75525 
75526 75527 75528 75529 
75530 75531 75532 75533 
75534 75535 75536 75537 
Q7951 Q654 Z87721 Q7100 
Q840 Q9381 Q780 Q799 Q998 
Q750 Q784 Q72899 Q7240 
Q759 Q171 Q738 Q731 Q937 
Q875 Q6502 Q872 Q7190 
Q1381 Q681 Q129 Q673 Q793 
Q772 Q992 Q690 Q359 Q142 
Q128 Q833 Q308 Q9389 Q972 
Q978 Q798 Q123 Q831 Q102 
Q743 Q164 Q6680 Q667 Q844 
Q175 Z87720 Q749 Q180 
Q76425 Q9388 Q824 Q792 
Q917 Q301 Q950 Q6589 Q870 
Q691 Q101 Q7000 Q321 Q107 
Q672 Q110 Q688 Q310 Q6581 
Q8901 Q742 Q162 Q767 Q165 
Q794 Q333 Q663 Q7010 Q892 
Q7200 Q820 Q159 Q161 
Z87730 Q8740 Q185 Q369 
Q692 Q971 Q302 Q1389 Q828 
Q76428 Q313 Q6689 Q173 
Q680 Q970 Q984 Q134 Q894 
Q933 Q318 Q913 Q132 Q909 
E7871 Q848 Q704 Q766 Q338 
Q778 Q763 Q348 Q765 
Z87790 Q809 Q782 Q140 
Q928 Q819 Q969 Q676 Q845 
Q113 Q181 Q341 Q178 Q360 
Q7160 Q841 Q781 Q7260 
Q7250 Q7210 Q851 Q822 
Q899 Q7120 Q783 Q163 Q158 
Q183 Q121 Q846 Z8775 Q379 
Q858 Q661 Q662 Q660 Q774 
Q796 Q6501 Q7150 Q821 
Q120 Z8776 Q776 Q160 Q999 
Q684 Q135 Q76427 Q985 
Q7649 Q871 Q8789 Q849 




75538 75539 7554 75550 
75551 75552 75553 75554 
75555 75556 75557 75558 
75559 75560 75561 75562 
75563 75564 75565 75566 
75567 75569 7558 7559 
7560 75610 75611 75612 
75613 75614 75615 75616 
75617 75619 7562 7563 
7564 75650 75651 75652 
75653 75654 75655 75656 
75659 7566 7567 75670 
75671 75672 75673 75679 
75681 75682 75683 75689 
7569 7570 7571 7572 
75731 75732 75733 75739 
7574 7575 7576 7578 7579 
7580 7581 7582 7583 
75831 75832 75833 75839 
7584 7585 7586 7587 7588 
75881 75889 7589 7590 
7591 7592 7593 7594 7595 
7596 7597 7598 75981 
75982 75983 75989 7599 
7952 V136 V1364 V1366 
V1368 V1369 
Q188 Q762 Q788 Q934 
Q76426 Q106 Q7959 Q678 
Q893 Q6650 Q709 Q682 Q130 
Q789 Q71899 Q7030 Q349 
E7872 Q843 Q6530 Q76419 
Q324 Q357 Q651 Q334 Q730 
Q111 Q7270 Q336 Q803 Q830 
Q184 Q7230 Q825 Q664 Q804 
Q988 Q771 Q891 Q130 Q182 
Q335 Q186 Q331 Q332 Q674 
Q170 Q7140 Q675 Q897 Q873 
Q832 Q378 Q6500 Q671 Q683 
Q8781 Q7110 Q189 Q842 
Q666 Q187 Q670 Q677 Q311 
Q6582 Q172 Q699 Q685 R898 
Q150 Q748 Q330 Q104 Q790 
Q100 Q141 Q143 Q148 Q838 
Q179 Q131 Q340 Q740 Q124 
Q103 Q112 Q8909 Q898 Q339 
Q761 Q7020 Q7220 Q6531 
Q760 Q174 Q741 Z87798 
Q6532 Q752 
Note. The CCS categories from AHRQ: https://www.hcup-
us.ahrq.gov/toolssoftware/ccs/AppendixASingleDX.txt 
 
B2. Model Fit Comparison 
Table B.4: Model Fit Comparison, Poisson Model versus Negative Binomial Model 
Model 
Maximum 
Difference At Value Mean Diff 
Poisson 0.321 2 0.072 
Negative Binomial 0.34 2 0.081 
Note. The Stata user-written command countfit was used to generate this result. 
 





















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Without State-Specific Linear Trend             
DID Point Estimates -0.08 -2.69** -0.23 -0.05 -0.11** -2.53*** -0.18 -0.05 
 
(0.05) (0.36) (0.11) (0.03) (0.04) (0.46) (0.12) (0.03) 
Ferman-Pinto P-Value 0.016 <0.001 0.001 0.177         
                  
With State-Specific Linear Trend            
DID Point Estimates -0.26*** NA -0.33* -0.11** -0.24*** -3.98 *** -0.33*** -0.11*** 
  (0.02)  (0.08) (0.01) (0.02) (1.03) (0.07) (0.01) 
Ferman-Pinto P-Value <0.001  <0.001 <0.001        
N  2,538,585 48,228 154,961 2,335,396 2,538,585 48,228 154,961 2,335,396 
Note. Standard errors are in the parentheses, clustered at the state level. Models control for birthweight, gestational age, sex, 
race, insurance type, relative household income, an indicator of congenital anomalies, an indicator of respiratory distress 
syndrome, urban; state-level poverty rate, unemployment rate, birth rate, NICU beds per 1,000 population, and state and year 
fixed effects. Marginal effects are reported for Poisson models. N denotes the number of observations.*** p<0.001, ** 







Table B.6: Effect of GBR on Length of Stay by Birthweight (2014 as the Implementation Year), 2011-2016   
By Infant Birthweight  
OLS Poisson 
<1500g 1500-2499g >=2500g <1500g 1500-2499g >=2500g 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Without State-specific linear trend   
DID point estimates -2.43* -0.45 -0.04 -2.85*** -0.62* -0.04 
  (0.49) (0.20) (0.03) (0.52) (0.29) (0.03) 
Ferman-Pinto P-value <0.001 <0.001 0.156       
N  34,717 169,761 2,334,107 34,717 169,761 2,334,107 
              
With State-specific linear trend            
DID point estimates  -0.95** -0.11** -3.18*** -0.98*** -0.11*** 
   (0.08) (0.01) (0.31) (0.07) (0.01) 
Ferman-Pinto P-value  <0.001 <0.001       
N  
 
169,761 2,334,107 34,717 169,761 2,334,107 
Note. Standard errors in the parentheses, clustered at state-level. Models control for birthweight, gestational age, sex,  race, insurance 
type, relative household income, an indicator of congenital anomalies, an indicator of respiratory distress syndrome, urban; state-level 
poverty rate, unemployment rate, birth rate, NICU bed per 1,000 population, and state and year fixed effects. Marginal effects are 






Table B.7: Effect of GBR on Total Cost of Birth (2014 as the Implementation Year), 2011-2016 
 
OLS Poisson 
Overall <=32 weeks 33-36 weeks >=37 weeks Overall <=32 weeks 33-36 weeks >=37 weeks 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Without State-Specific Linear Trend             
DID Point Estimates -0.08* -0.17** -0.08** -0.08* -434.12*** -11993.91*** -1165.33*** -209.50*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (67.56) (1767.47) (129.96) (32.95) 
Ferman-Pinto P-Value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001         
                  
With State-Specific Linear Trend            
DID Point Estimates 0.10** -0.19* 0.11* 0.11** 362.93*** -8327.91 933.46** 188.89*** 
  (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02) (51.50) (4360.25) (306.11) (29.69) 
Ferman-Pinto P-Value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001        
N  2,538,585 48,228 154,961 2,335,396 2,538,585 48,228 154,961 2,335,396 
Note. Standard errors are in the parentheses, clustered at the state level. Models control for birthweight, gestational age, sex, race, 
insurance type, relative household income, an indicator of congenital anomalies, an indicator of respiratory distress syndrome, urban; 
state-level poverty rate, unemployment rate, birth rate, NICU beds per 1,000 population, and state and year fixed effects. Marginal 







Table B.8: Effect of GBR on Total Cost of Birth by Birthweight (2014 as the Implementation Year), 2011-2016  
By Infant Birthweight  
OLS GLM 
<1500g 1500-2499g >=2500g <1500g 1500-2499g >=2500g 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Without State-specific linear trend  
     DID point estimates -0.15* -0.14*** -0.08* -17095.17*** -2593.06*** -201.16*** 
 
(0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (2392.64) (95.00) (32.23) 
Ferman-Pinto P-value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001       
N 34,717 169,761 2,334,107 34,717 169,761 2,334,107 
              
With State-specific linear trend            
DID point estimates  0.04 0.12** -10488.03*** -254.75* 201.95*** 
   (0.03) (0.02) (1374.44) (129.43) (30.72) 
Ferman-Pinto P-value  <0.001 <0.001       
N  169,761 2,334,107 34,717 169,761 2,334,107 
Note. Standard errors in the parentheses, clustered at state-level. Models control for birthweight, gestational age, sex,  race, insurance type, relative 
household income, an indicator of congenital anomalies, an indicator of respiratory distress syndrome, urban; state-level poverty rate, 
unemployment rate, birth rate, NICU bed per 1,000 population, and state and year fixed effects. Marginal effects are reported for GLM models. N 






Table B.9: Effect of GBR on Services Utilization (2014 as the Implementation Year), 2011-2016  
  
All Births 
NICU Care Special Care  
Radiology 









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Without State-specific linear trend            
DID estimates -0.86* -0.97* -0.36 -0.05* -0.61 -0.05 2.01* 
 
(0.19) (0.27) (0.14) (0.01) (0.26) (0.02) (0.44) 
Ferman-Pinto 
P-value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.071 <0.001 <0.001 
                
With State-specific linear trend            
DID estimates  NA  NA  NA  NA NA  -0.03* -3.56** 
 
          (0.01) (0.47) 
Ferman-Pinto 
P-value           <0.001 <0.001 
Note. N=2,538,585. Percentage points are reported. Standard errors in the parentheses, clustered at the state level. Models control for 
birthweight, gestational age, sex, race, insurance type, relative household income, an indicator of congenital anomalies, an indicator of 
respiratory distress syndrome, urban; state-level poverty rate, unemployment rate, birth rate, NICU beds per 1,000 population, and 





   Appendix C
Table C.1: Percent of Births by State and Insurance Type, 2016-2017  
State Medicaid Private 
Self-
pay Other 
Alabama 50.42 45.12 2.08 2.39 
Alaska 39.33 37.40 3.18 20.09 
Arizona 52.54 40.30 4.39 2.76 
Arkansas 46.98 49.06 2.94 1.03 
California 42.96 48.50 4.27 4.27 
Colorado 39.18 51.64 2.60 6.58 
Connecticut 35.88 57.00 5.05 2.07 
Delaware 43.26 51.36 1.91 3.47 
District Of Columbia 37.22 57.08 0.90 4.80 
Florida 48.98 41.72 6.21 3.08 
Georgia 45.43 39.03 6.69 8.86 
Hawaii 31.38 42.17 3.32 23.12 
Idaho 37.20 53.38 5.83 3.59 
Illinois 41.18 56.36 1.55 0.91 
Indiana 40.82 52.54 4.64 1.99 
Iowa 40.66 55.46 2.95 0.93 
Kansas 30.56 57.25 6.77 5.42 
Kentucky 49.80 43.57 3.53 3.09 
Louisiana 62.48 34.06 0.84 2.62 
Maine 39.51 54.33 4.04 2.12 
Maryland 40.64 52.44 3.10 3.81 
Massachusetts 27.50 67.97 0.80 3.74 
Michigan 42.52 55.62 1.40 0.45 
Minnesota 32.24 63.32 2.38 2.06 
Mississippi 64.48 31.41 3.10 1.02 
Missouri 39.26 55.27 3.47 2.00 
Montana 41.27 47.84 5.23 5.66 
Nebraska 33.94 59.14 3.88 3.05 
Nevada 47.48 43.73 5.03 3.76 
New Hampshire 27.84 67.02 1.70 3.44 
New Jersey 31.12 59.61 8.26 1.00 
New Mexico 59.49 27.18 6.67 6.66 
New York 48.32 47.11 1.19 3.38 
North Carolina 42.70 45.65 6.86 4.79 
North Dakota 24.57 57.22 2.35 15.85 




Oklahoma 51.55 39.97 2.06 6.42 
Oregon 45.00 51.72 2.04 1.24 
Pennsylvania 34.54 58.53 4.68 2.25 
Rhode Island 46.88 50.62 0.71 1.80 
South Carolina 51.09 41.61 2.95 4.36 
South Dakota 30.82 60.81 2.96 5.41 
Tennessee 49.73 43.22 2.03 5.02 
Texas 46.65 39.15 8.21 5.98 
Utah 25.95 64.33 5.40 4.32 
Vermont 41.55 52.04 1.89 4.53 
Virginia 30.09 62.51 5.33 2.08 
Washington 39.72 52.58 1.11 6.59 
West Virginia 51.21 45.85 2.07 0.88 
Wisconsin 36.81 58.21 2.92 2.06 
Wyoming 33.03 54.54 7.95 4.48 



































Abadie, Alberto, Alexis Diamond, and Jens Hainmueller. 2015. “Comparative 
Politics and the Synthetic Control Method.” American Journal of Political 
Science 59 (2): 495–510. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12116. 
Alexander, Greg R., Michael D. Kogan, John H. Himes, Joanne M. Mor, and Robert 
Goldenberg. 1999. “Racial Differences in Birthweight for Gestational Age and 
Infant Mortality in Extremely-Low-Risk US Populations.” Paediatric and 
Perinatal Epidemiology 13 (2): 205–17. https://doi.org/10.1046/j.1365-
3016.1999.00174.x. 
American Academy of Pediatrics. 2004. “Levels of Neonatal Care.” 
https://doi.org/10.1542/peds.2004-1697. 
———. 2012. “Levels of Neonatal Care.” https://doi.org/10.1542/peds.2012-1999. 
Anderson, Michael, Carlos Dobkin, and Tal Gross. 2012. “The Effect of Health 
Insurance Coverage on the Use of Medical Services.” American Economic 
Journal: Economic Policy 4 (1): 1–27. https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.4.1.1. 
Andrews, Roxanne M. 2015. “Statewide Hospital Discharge Data: Collection, Use, 
Limitations, and Improvements.” Health Services Research 50 (S1): 1273–99. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6773.12343. 
Angert, Robert, and Henry M Adam. 2008. “Care of the Very Low-Birthweight 
Infant.” Pediatrics in Review 30 (1): 32–35. https://doi.org/10.1542/pir.30-1-32. 
Baker, Laurence C, and Ciaran S Phibbs. 2002. “Managed Care, Technology 
Adoption, and Health Care: The Adoption of Neonatal Intensive.” Source: The 
RAND Journal of Economics. Vol. 33. 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3087471.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Af3325d7c5
4d53ba240954d493e6d1fae. 
Baltimore City Health Department. 2009. “A Strategic Approach Baltimore City 
Infant Mortality Rate (Deaths/1,000 Live Births).” 
http://www.healthybabiesbaltimore.com/uploads/files/Bmore 5 Year Brochure 
for viewing lr.pdf. 
Barradas, Danielle T, Martin P Wasserman, Lekisha Daniel-Robinson, Marino A 
Bruce, Katherine Isselmann Disantis, Frederick H Navarro, Warren A Jones, et 
al. 2016. “Hospital Utilization and Costs Among Preterm Infants by Payer: 
Nationwide Inpatient Sample, 2009 HHS Public Access.” Matern Child Health J 
20 (4): 808–18. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10995-015-1911-y. 
Beil, Heather, Susan G. Haber, Katherine Giuriceo, Peter Amico, Marisa Morrison, 
Christopher Beadles, Olivia Berzin, et al. 2019. “Maryland’s Global Hospital 
Budgets: Impacts on Medicare Cost and Utilization for the First 3 Years.” 




Berenson, Robert A. 2015. “Maryland’s New All-Payer Hospital Demonstration.” 
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/73836/2000517-
Maryland%27s-New-All-Payer-Hospital-Demonstration.pdf. 
Bilgel, Firat, and Brian Galle. 2015. “Financial Incentives for Kidney Donation: A 
Comparative Case Study Using Synthetic Controls.” Journal of Health 
Economics 43 (September): 103–17. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2015.06.007. 
BLS. 2019. “Producer Price Index (PPI).” 2019. https://www.bls.gov/ppi/data.htm. 
Botosaru, Irene, and Bruno Ferman. 2019. “On the Role of Covariates in the 
Synthetic Control Method.” Econometrics Journal 22 (2): 117–30. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/ectj/utz001. 
Boudreaux, Michel, Yoon Sun Choi, Liyang Xie, and Daniel Marthey. 2019. 
“Medicaid Expansion at Title X Clinics.” Medical Care 57 (6): 437–43. 
https://doi.org/10.1097/mlr.0000000000001120. 
Boudreaux, Michel H., Rada K. Dagher, and Scott A. Lorch. 2018. “The Association 
of Health Reform and Infant Health: Evidence from Massachusetts.” Health 
Services Research 53 (4): 2406–25. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6773.12779. 
Braveman, Paula A., Susan Egerter, Trude Bennett, and Jonathan Showstack. 1991. 
“Differences in Hospital Resource Allocation Among Sick Newborns According 
to Insurance Coverage.” JAMA: The Journal of the American Medical 
Association 266 (23): 3300. https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.1991.03470230058031. 
Brown, Clare C., Jennifer E. Moore, Holly C. Felix, M. Kathryn Stewart, T. Mac 
Bird, Curtis L. Lowery, and J. Mick Tilford. 2019. “Association of State 
Medicaid Expansion Status with Low Birth Weight and Preterm Birth.” JAMA - 
Journal of the American Medical Association 321 (16): 1598–1609. 
https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2019.3678. 
Buntin, Melinda Beeuwkes, and Alan M. Zaslavsky. 2004. “Too Much Ado about 
Two-Part Models and Transformation?: Comparing Methods of Modeling 
Medicare Expenditures.” Journal of Health Economics 23 (3): 525–42. 
CDC. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 2003. “U.S. Standard Certificate 
of Live Birth.” http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/vital_certs_rev.htm. 
———. 2010. “User Guide to the 2010 Natality Public Use File.” 
ftp://ftp.cdc.gov/pub/Health_Statistics/NCHS/Dataset_Documentation/DVS/nata
lity/UserGuide2010.pdf. 
———. 2016a. “FastStats - Births and Natality.” Centers for Disease Control. 
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/births.htm. 
———. 2016b. “User Guide to the  2016 Natality Public Use File.” 
ftp://ftp.cdc.gov/pub/Health_Statistics/NCHS/Dataset_Documentation/DVS/nata
lity/UserGuide2016.pdf. 




———. 2019. “NVSS - National Vital Statistics System.” 2019. 
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/index.htm. 
Center for Health Statistics, National. 2003. “Birth Edit Specifications for the 2003 
Proposed Revision of the U.S. Standard Certificate of Birth.” 
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/dvs/birth_edit_specifications.pdf. 
Center for Medicare & Medicaid Innovation. 2018. “Innovation Models.” 2018. 
https://innovation.cms.gov/initiatives/index.html#views=models. 
Cloherty, John P, Eric C Eichenwald, Anne R Hansen, and Ann R Stark. 2012. 
Manual of Neonatal Care. 7th ed. LIPPINCOTT WILLIAMS & WILKINS. 
https://doi.org/10.1097/01.pec.0000136078.50143.a7. 
CMS. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. 2018. “Maryland All-Payer 
Model.” 2018. https://innovation.cms.gov/initiatives/Maryland-All-Payer-
Model/. 
———. 2019a. “ICD-10.” 2019. 
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Coding/ICD10/index?redirect=/ICD10. 
———. 2019b. “Pennsylvania Rural Health Model | Center for Medicare & Medicaid 
Innovation.” 2019. https://innovation.cms.gov/initiatives/pa-rural-health-model/. 
———. 2019c. “Vermont All-Payer ACO Model | Center for Medicare & Medicaid 
Innovation.” 2019. https://innovation.cms.gov/initiatives/vermont-all-payer-aco-
model/. 
———. 2019d. “Acute Inpatient PPS.” 2019. 
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-
Payment/AcuteInpatientPPS. 
Cohen, A Harold. 2005. “Maryland’s All-Payor Hospital Payment System.” 
http://www.hscrc.state.md.us/Documents/pdr/GeneralInformation/MarylandAll-
PayorHospitalSystem.pdf. 
Currie, Janet, and Jonathan Gruber. 2001. “Public Health Insurance and Medical 
Treatment: The Equalizing Impact of the Medicaid Expansions.” Journal of 
Public Economics 82 (1): 63–89. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00140-
7. 
Cutler, David M., and Mark McClellan. 2001. “Is Technological Change in Medicine 
Worth It?” Health Affairs 20 (5): 11–29. https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.20.5.11. 
Cutler, David M, and Ellen Meara. 2000. The Technology of Birth: Is It Worth It? 
NBER/Frontiers in Health Policy Research. Vol. 3. 
https://doi.org/10.1162/109623100300091069. 
Dartmouth Atlas Project. 2019. “Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care.” 2019. 
https://www.dartmouthatlas.org/. 
David C. Goodman, George A. Little, Wade N. Harrison, Atle Moen, Meredith E. 
Mowitz, Cecilia Ganduglia-Cazaban, Kristen K. Bronner, Julie R. Doherty. 




Dieleman, Joseph L., Ellen Squires, Anthony L. Bui, Madeline Campbell, Abigail 
Chapin, Hannah Hamavid, Cody Horst, et al. 2017. “Factors Associated With 
Increases in US Health Care Spending, 1996-2013.” JAMA 318 (17): 1668. 
https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2017.15927. 
Dimick, Justin B., and Andrew M. Ryan. 2014. “Methods for Evaluating Changes in 
Health Care Policy: The Difference-in-Differences Approach.” JAMA - Journal 
of the American Medical Association 312 (22): 2401–2. 
https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2014.16153. 
Donahue, Sara M.A., Ken P. Kleinman, Matthew W. Gillman, and Emily Oken. 2010. 
“Trends in Birth Weight and Gestational Length among Singleton Term Births 
in the United States: 1990-2005.” Obstetrics and Gynecology 115 (2 PART 1): 
357–64. https://doi.org/10.1097/AOG.0b013e3181cbd5f5. 
Done, Nicolae, Bradley Herring, and Tim Xu. 2019. “The Effects of Global Budget 
Payments on Hospital Utilization in Rural Maryland.” Health Services Research 
54 (3): 526–36. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6773.13162. 
Dunn, Abe, Scott D. Grosse, and Samuel H. Zuvekas. 2018. “Adjusting Health 
Expenditures for Inflation: A Review of Measures for Health Services Research 
in the United States.” Health Services Research 53 (1): 175–96. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6773.12612. 
Fenton, Tanis R, and Jae H Kim. 2013. “A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis to 
Revise the Fenton Growth Chart for Preterm Infants.” BMC Pediatrics 13 (1): 
59. https://doi.org/10.1186/1471-2431-13-59. 
Ferman, Bruno, and Cristine Pinto. 2019. “Inference in Differences-in-Differences 
with Few Treated Groups and Heteroskedasticity.” The Review of Economics 
and Statistics 101 (3): 452–67. https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_00759. 
Finkelstein, Amy, Sarah Taubman, Bill Wright, Mira Bernstein, Jonathan Gruber, 
Joseph P Newhouse, Heidi Allen, and Katherine Baicker. 2012. “The Oregon 
Health Insurance Experiment: Evidence from the First Year.” Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 127 (3): 1057–1106. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjs020. 
Freedman, Seth. 2016a. “Capacity and Utilization in Health Care: The Effect of 
Empty Beds on Neonatal Intensive Care Admission.” American Economic 
Journal: Economic Policy 8 (2): 154–85. https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20120393. 
———. 2016b. “Online Appendix Capacity and Utilization in Health Care: The 
Effect of Empty Beds on Neonatal Intensive Care Admission A-1.” 
https://assets.aeaweb.org/assets/production/articles-
attachments/aej/pol/app/0802/2012-0393_app.pdf. 
Freedman, Seth, Haizhen Lin, and Kosali Simon. 2015. “Public Health Insurance 
Expansions and Hospital Technology Adoption.” Journal of Public Economics 
121 (January): 117–31. https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JPUBECO.2014.10.005. 
Giuriceo, Katherine, Susan Haber, Heather Beil, Walter Adamache, Peter Amico, 
Christopher Beadles, Olicia Berzin, et al. 2016. “Evaluation of the Maryland 





———. 2018. “Evaluation of the Maryland All-Payer Model: Third Annual Report.” 
https://downloads.cms.gov/files/cmmi/md-all-payer-thirdannrpt.pdf. 
Giuriceo, Katherine, Susan Haber, ScD Heather Beil, Walter Adamache, Peter 
Amico, Christopher Beadles, Olivia Berzin, et al. 2017. “Evaluation of the 
Maryland All-Payer Model Second Annual Report.” 
https://innovation.cms.gov/Files/reports/md-all-payer-secondannrpt.pdf. 
Giuriceo, Katherine, Susan Haber, ScD Heather Beil, Marisa Morrison, Leslie 
Greenwald, Rebecca Perry, Linda Jiang, et al. 2019. “Evaluation of the 
Maryland All-Payer Model Volume I: Final Report Prepared For.” 
Goodman, David C., Elliott S. Fisher, George A. Little, Thérèse A. Stukel, Chiang-
Hua Chang, and Kenneth S. Schoendorf. 2002. “The Relation Between the 
Availability of Neonatal Intensive Care and Neonatal Mortality.” Obstetrical & 
Gynecological Survey 57 (11): 731–32. https://doi.org/10.1097/00006254-
200211000-00010. 
Goodman, David C., Cecilia Ganduglia-Cazaban, Luisa Franzini, Therese A. Stukel, 
Jared R. Wasserman, Megan A. Murphy, Youngran Kim, et al. 2019. “Neonatal 
Intensive Care Variation in Medicaid-Insured Newborns: A Population-Based 
Study.” Journal of Pediatrics 209 (June): 44-51.e2. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpeds.2019.02.014. 
Hall, Eric S., Matthew D. Lang, Linda Levin, and Vivek Narendran. 2015. “Variation 
in Neonatal Inpatient Charges at the State and Local Level.” Hospital Topics 93 
(2): 27–35. https://doi.org/10.1080/00185868.2015.1052273. 
Halpern, Neil A, Debra A Goldman, Kay See Tan, and Stephen M Pastores. 2016. 
“Trends in Critical Care Beds and Use among Population Groups and Medicare 
and Medicaid Beneficiaries in the United States: 2000-2010.” Critical Care 
Medicine 44 (8): 1490–99. https://doi.org/10.1097/CCM.0000000000001722. 
Harrison, Wade, and David Goodman. 2015. “Epidemiologic Trends in Neonatal 
Intensive Care, 2007-2012.” JAMA Pediatrics 169 (9): 855–62. 
https://doi.org/10.1001/jamapediatrics.2015.1305. 
Harrison, Wade N., Jared R. Wasserman, and David C. Goodman. 2018. “Regional 
Variation in Neonatal Intensive Care Admissions and the Relationship to Bed 
Supply.” Journal of Pediatrics 192 (January): 73-79.e4. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpeds.2017.08.028. 
HCUP. Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project. 2019a. “HCUP-US SID Overview.” 
2019. https://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/sidoverview.jsp. 
———. 2019b. “HCUP-US Cost-to-Charge Ratio Files.” Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality, Rockville, MD. 2019. https://www.hcup-
us.ahrq.gov/db/state/costtocharge.jsp. 





HRSA. Health Resources & Services Administration. 2019. “HRSA Data Warehouse 
– Area Health Resource Files.” 2019. 
https://datawarehouse.hrsa.gov/topics/ahrf.aspx. 
Howell, Embry M., Douglas Richardson, Paul Ginsburg, and Barbara Foot. 2002. 
“Deregionalization of Neonatal Intensive Care in Urban Areas.” American 
Journal of Public Health 92 (1): 119–24. https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.92.1.119. 




———. 2018a. “All-Payer Model Results, CY 2014-2017.” 
http://www.hscrc.state.md.us/Documents/Modernization/Updated APM results 
through PY4.pdf. 
———. 2018b. “Maryland’s All-Payer Hospital Model Results Performance Year 
Three.” http://www.hscrc.state.md.us/Documents/Modernization/Maryland 
APM Performance Report -CY2016_3_9_18.pdf. 
Jackson, Heide. 2018. “Health Status and Medical Services Utilization: 2013.” 
www.census.gov/sipp. 
Jorgensen, Anne M. 2012. “A Century of Caring: 100 Years of NICU Nursing.” 
https://static.abbottnutrition.com/cms-prod/anhi-2017.org/img/history-of-
neonatology_tcm1423-102720.pdf. 
Karaca, Zeynal, and Brian Moore. 2013. “Geographic Variation in Hospital Inpatient 
List Prices in the United States, 2013.” 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/02/business/medicare-payments-billing-
hospitals-doctors.html. 
Kastor, John A., and Eli Y. Adashi. 2011. “Maryland’s Hospital Cost Review 
Commission at 40: A Model for the Country.” JAMA - Journal of the American 
Medical Association 306 (10): 1137–38. 
https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2011.1311. 
Kaul, Ashok, Stefan Klößner, Gregor Pfeifer, and Manuel Schieler. 2018. “Synthetic 
Control Methods: Never Use All Pre-Intervention Outcomes Together with 
Covariates.” Working Paper, no. 83790 (March): 1–20. 
Keith K. 2019. “Unpacking The House Medicare-For-All Bill.” Health Affairs Blog. 
2019. https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20190302.150578/full/. 
KFF. The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation. 2014. “Medicare Spending Per 
Enrollee, by State.” State Health Facts. 2014. 
https://www.kff.org/medicare/state-indicator/per-enrollee-spending-by-
residence/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Per 
Enrollee Medicare Spending by Residence%22,%22sort%22:%22desc%22%7D. 
———.  2017. “Distribution of the Total Population by Federal Poverty Level (above 







———. 2019. “Trends in Medicaid Income Eligibility Limits.” 2019. 
https://www.kff.org/data-collection/trends-in-medicaid-income-eligibility-
limits/. 
Kilpatrick, Sarah J, Lu-Ann Papile, and George A Macones. 2017. Guidelines for 
Perinatal Care. Am Acad Pediatrics. 
Kowlessar, Niranjana M, Joanna Jiang, and Claudia Steiner. 2013. “Hospital Stays for 
Newborns, 2011,” 12. https://www.hcup-
us.ahrq.gov/reports/statbriefs/sb163.pdf. 
Kreif, Noémi, Richard Grieve, Dominik Hangartner, Alex James Turner, Silviya 
Nikolova, and Matt Sutton. 2016. “Examination of the Synthetic Control Method 
for Evaluating Health Policies with Multiple Treated Units.” Health Economics 
(United Kingdom) 25 (12): 1514–28. https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.3258. 
Kuo, Dennis Z, Jay G Berry, • Matt Hall, • Robert, E Lyle, • Christopher, and J Stille. 
2018. “Health-Care Spending and Utilization for Children Discharged from a 
Neonatal Intensive Care Unit.” Journal of Perinatology 38: 734–41. 
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41372-018-0055-5. 
Lantos, John. 2010. “Cruel Calculus: Why Saving Premature Babies Is Better 
Business than Helping Them Thrive.” Health Affairs. 
https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.2009.0897. 
Lau, C., N. Ambalavanan, H. Chakraborty, M. S. Wingate, and W. A. Carlo. 2013. 
“Extremely Low Birth Weight and Infant Mortality Rates in the United States.” 
PEDIATRICS 131 (5): 855–60. https://doi.org/10.1542/peds.2012-2471. 
Long, J. Scott, and Jeremy Freese. 2014. Stata Bookstore: Regression Models for 
Categorical Dependent Variables Using Stata, Third Edition. Stata Press. 
Lorch, S A, P Maheshwari, and O Even-Shoshan. 2012. “The Impact of Certificate of 
Need Programs on Neonatal Intensive Care Units.” Journal of Perinatology 32 
(1): 39–44. https://doi.org/10.1038/jp.2011.47. 
Lorch, Scott A., Corinne E. Ahlberg, Dylan S. Small, and Michael Baiocchi. 2012. 
“The Differential Impact of Delivery Hospital on the Outcomes of Premature 
Infants.” Pediatrics 130 (2): 270–78. https://doi.org/10.1542/peds.2011-2820. 
Martin, Joyce A, and Fay Menacker. 2004. “National Vital Statistics Reports, Vol. 
55, No. 12 (4/19/2007).” Vol. 55. 
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr55/nvsr55_12.pdf. 
Maryland Department of Health. 2017. “Maryland Department of Health Medical 
Assistance.” https://mmcp.health.maryland.gov/Documents/2017 UB04 Hospital 
Instructions-Final 8FEB2018.pdf. 
Maryland Health Care Commission. 2015. “Annual Report on Selected Maryland 






Mcguire, Thomas G. 2000. “Physician Agency.” Handbook of Health Economics. 
Vol. 1. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1574-0064(00)80168-7. 
Meer, Jonathan, and Harvey S. Rosen. 2004. “Insurance and the Utilization of 
Medical Services.” Social Science and Medicine 58 (9): 1623–32. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0277-9536(03)00394-0. 
Mortensen, Karoline, Chad Perman, and Jie Chen. 2014. “Innovative Payment 
Mechanisms in Maryland Hospitals: An Empirical Analysis of Readmissions 
under Total Patient Revenue.” Healthcare 2 (3): 177–83. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.hjdsi.2014.03.002. 
Murray, Robert. 2009. “Setting Hospital Rates to Control Costs and Boost Quality: 
The Maryland Experience.” Health Affairs 28 (5): 1395–1405. 
https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.28.5.1395. 
National Center for Health Statistics. 2012. “Birth Edit Specifications for the 2003 
Proposed Revision of the U.S. Standard Certificate of Birth.” 
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/dvs/birth_edit_specifications.pdf. 
New York State Department of Health. 2012. “SPARCS Appendix I- Revnue Codes.” 
2012. https://www.health.ny.gov/statistics/sparcs/sysdoc/appi.htm. 
Papanicolas, Irene, Liana R. Woskie, and Ashish K. Jha. 2018. “Health Care 
Spending in the United States and Other High-Income Countries.” JAMA. 
https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2018.1150. 
Park, James D, Edward Kim, and Rachel M Werner. 2015. “Inpatient Hospital 
Charge Variability of U.S. Hospitals.” Journal of General Internal Medicine 30 
(11): 1627–32. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11606-015-3352-0. 
Patel, Ankit, Rahul Rajkumar, John M. Colmers, Donna Kinzer, Patrick H. Conway, 
and Joshua M. Sharfstein. 2015. “Maryland’s Global Hospital Budgets — 
Preliminary Results from an All-Payer Model.” New England Journal of 
Medicine 373 (20): 1899–1901. https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMp1508037. 
Phibbs, Ciaran S., Susan K Schmitt, Laurence C Baker, Aaron B Caughey, Roderic H 
Phibbs, and Beate Danielsen. 2007. “Level and Volume of Neonatal Intensive 
Care and Mortality in Very-Low-Birth-Weight Infants.” New England Journal of 
Medicine 356 (21): 2165–75. https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMsa065029. 
Pines, Jesse M., Sonal Vats, Mark S. Zocchi, and Bernard Black. 2019. “Maryland’s 
Experiment With Capitated Payments For Rural Hospitals: Large Reductions In 
Hospital-Based Care.” Health Affairs 38 (4): 594–603. 
https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.2018.05366. 
Pope, Chris. 2019. “When Government Sets Hospital Prices: Maryland’s Experience | 
Manhattan Institute.” 
Riley, Gerald F. 2009. “Administrative and Claims Records as Sources of Health 




Roberts, Eric T., Laura A. Hatfield, J. Michael McWilliams, Michael E. Chernew, 
Nicolae Done, Sule Gerovich, Lauren Gilstrap, and Ateev Mehrotra. 2018. 
“Changes in Hospital Utilization Three Years into Maryland’s Global Budget 
Program for Rural Hospitals.” Health Affairs 37 (4): 644–53. 
https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.2018.0112. 
Roberts, Eric T., J. Michael McWilliams, Laura A. Hatfield, Sule Gerovich, Michael 
E. Chernew, Lauren G. Gilstrap, and Ateev Mehrotra. 2018. “Changes in Health 
Care Use Associated With the Introduction of Hospital Global Budgets in 
Maryland.” JAMA Internal Medicine 178 (2): 260–68. 
https://doi.org/10.1001/jamainternmed.2017.7455. 
Roemer, Milton Irwin. 1961. “Bed Supply and Hospital Utilization: A Natural 
Experiment.” Undefined. 
Russell, Rebecca B, Nancy S Green, Claudia A Steiner, Susan Meikle, Jennifer L 
Howse, Karalee Poschman, Todd Dias, et al. 2007. “Cost of Hospitalization for 
Preterm and Low Birth Weight Infants in the United States.” 
https://doi.org/10.1542/peds.2006-2386. 
Salemi, Jason L., Meg M. Comins, Kristen Chandler, Mulubrhan F. Mogos, and 
Hamisu M. Salihu. 2013. “A Practical Approach for Calculating Reliable Cost 
Estimates from Observational Data: Application to Cost Analyses in Maternal 
and Child Health.” Applied Health Economics and Health Policy 11 (4): 343–57. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s40258-013-0040-2. 
Schroeder, Steven A, and William Frist. 2013. “Phasing Out Fee-for-Service 
Payment.” N Engl j Med. Vol. 21. 
https://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMsb1302322. 
Schulman, Joseph, David Braun, Henry C. Lee, Jochen Profit, Grace Duenas, Mihoko 
V. Bennett, Robert J. Dimand, Maria Jocson, and Jeffrey B. Gould. 2018. 
“Association between Neonatal Intensive Care Unit Admission Rates and Illness 
Acuity.” JAMA Pediatrics 172 (1): 17–23. 
https://doi.org/10.1001/jamapediatrics.2017.3913. 
Schulman, Marjorie. 2003. “Neonatology and Emerging Trends in Health Insurance.” 
American Journal of Perinatology 20 (8): 433–39. https://doi.org/10.1055/s-
2003-45386. 
Schwartz, R M, R Kellogg, and J H Muri. 2000. “Specialty Newborn Care: Trends 
and Issues.” J Perinatol 20 (8 Pt 1): 520–29. 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&do
pt=Citation&list_uids=11190593. 
Sharfstein, Joshua M., Donna Kinzer, and John M. Colmers. 2015. “An Update on 
Maryland’s All-Payer Approach to Reforming the Delivery of Health Care.” 
JAMA Internal Medicine 175 (7): 1083. 
https://doi.org/10.1001/jamainternmed.2015.1616. 
State Health Compare. 2019. “SHADAC Analysis of Prescription Opioid Painkiller 








WHO. 2007. “Neonatal and Perinatal Mortality: Country, Regional and Global 
Estimates.” https://doi.org/10.2307/41110883. 
Wing, Coady, Kosali Simon, and Ricardo A Bello-Gomez. 2018. “Designing 
Difference in Difference Studies: Best Practices for Public Health Policy 
Research Keywords.” Annu. Rev. Public Health 39: 453–69. 
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-publhealth. 
Wolfers, Justin. 2006. “Did Unilateral Divorce Laws Raise Divorce Rates? A 
Reconciliation and New Results.” American Economic Review. 
https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.96.5.1802. 
Woolhandler, Steffie, and David U. Himmelstein. 2019. “Single-Payer Reform - 
‘Medicare for All.’” JAMA - Journal of the American Medical Association 321 
(24): 2399–2400. https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2019.7031. 
Xu, Jiaquan, Sherry L Murphy, Kenneth D Kochanek, Brigham Bastian, and 
Elizabeth Arias. 2018. “National Vital Statistics Reports Volume 67, Number 5 
July 26, 2018, Deaths: Final Data for 2016.” National Vital Statistics Reports. 
Vol. 67. https://www.cdc.gov/. 
 
